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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic created an unprecedented economic shock across the world. As a
result of the coronavirus outbreak and the related health measures, nonfinancial
corporations providing nonessential goods or services that cannot be consumed remotely
have experienced a large decrease in their turnover. Using balance sheets and flows
statements, we are able to quantify the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial corporations
and households, according to several scenarios for the pandemic over 2021. The impact is
largely heterogeneous across sectors and amounts to up to 20% of the turnover for euro area
nonfinancial corporations. Stress in these corporations and households can spill over to
banks in the form of nonperforming loans (NPLs). The size and targeted nature of
government support as well as the financial soundness (that is, net worth) with which
economic agents entered the pandemic define the amount of NPLs that arise. Based on our
estimates, the increase of NPLs seems limited, also when considering second-round effects
from corporate insolvencies (about 5% to 7% of total loans). However, in certain cases, when
banks are only slightly above the minimum prudential requirement of the leverage ratio,
their solvency position may be threatened.
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I. Introduction and Motivation
In the early months of 2020, a virus originating in China spread across the world, driving the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) toward the most severe pandemic in this century. Before
this event, little attention was paid to the economic consequences of pandemics. Two
pioneering papers, written in the context of the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)
outbreak in 2005, are worth noting. McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) develops a model
considering the consequences of a flu-like pandemic on the global economy under different
scenarios and finds that a pandemic similar to the Spanish flu would cause a drop of real GDP
exceeding 10%. The US Congressional Budget Office (US CBO 2005) undertakes a similar
exercise, and its severe scenario implies a GDP drop close to 5%.
The nature of the shock the COVID-19 pandemic has caused is unprecedented and differs
significantly from other episodes of crisis in peace times, such as the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) or the oil crisis in the 1970s. It is necessary to go back to the Spanish flu of 1918–1919
and to the Great Depression to find a similar shock to the world economy during peace years.
Garrett (2007) looks at the response to the pandemic by different cities in the US in 1918–
1919 and finds that those cities that went for a total lockdown suffered more severe
economic losses in the short term (up to 50% in restaurants, for example) but were able to
recover quickly. Cities that implemented partial lockdowns did not get any tangible results
from these policies. De Santis and Van der Veken (2020) quantify a sizable impact of the
pandemic in terms of output loss and macroeconomic risks, perceiving an increase in income
inequality across countries. Barro, Ursúa, and Weng (2020) identify a decrease in GDP and
in consumption of 6% and 8%, respectively, as a result of the Spanish flu pandemic. On the
post-pandemic impact, Brainerd and Siegler (2003) find a strong positive influence of the
Spanish flu pandemic on growth in the subsequent 10 years. Going further into past similar
shocks, Jordà, Singh, and Taylor (2020) study several pandemics (and wars) over history and
conclude that the macroeconomic effects of pandemics persist for about 40 years, with real
rates of return substantially depressed, as there was no destruction of capital in previous
pandemics (contrary to wars).
Since March 2020, international institutions, central banks, and the academic community
have tried to forecast economic growth under the COVID-19 pandemic, based on models
developed to take into account the specific functioning of an economy subject to a contagious
virus. The magnitude of the economic recession the COVID-19 pandemic has caused is found
to be particularly significant (ECB 2020; IMF 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic shock is
somehow unique. Differently from “typical” financial shocks, it did not originate in the
financial system and is affecting all countries to a certain extent (the GFC, by contrast, did
not substantially affect emerging economies). Each national economy has been hit by the
pandemic with a different degree of resilience and subject to different vulnerabilities. The
ultimate economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic accordingly depends on these two
factors, which also interrelate closely with the combined policy response, in terms of
committed and potential fiscal space of governments.
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The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has spurred an intense research effort in the
academic community to understand the nature and size of the shock it caused. With no
purpose of being exhaustive, we can highlight the findings of McKibbin and Fernando (2020),
which models seven scenarios for the evolution of the pandemic and assesses their impacts
on GDP. Even the milder scenarios could significantly affect the global economy in the short
term, with more severe scenarios leading to negative GDP growth rates of about 10% in the
first year after the pandemic outbreak. Battistini and Stoevsky (2020) considers the impact
across the main sectors of nonfinancial corporations and finds large heterogeneity across
them, although with a bleak picture overall. Carletti et al. (2020) finds that a three-month
lockdown could decrease profits of nonfinancial corporations by 10% of quarterly GDP. The
authors identify more frequent distress in small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), in
highly leveraged nonfinancial corporations before the pandemic, and in the manufacturing
and wholesale trade sectors. Boissay and Rungcharoenkitkul (2020) takes stock of the
existing literature and of the latest forecasts regarding the impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic. Gourinchas et al. (2020) uses a model to estimate the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on business failures among SMEs in 17 countries using firm-level data. In the
absence of government support policies, failures are expected to increase significantly,
although they should not threaten the aggregated solvency position of banks.
More recently, Mojon, Rees, and Schmieder (2021) also finds substantial losses in the sectors
most affected by the pandemic, but these do not translate into large corporate credit loss
rates, because the most affected sectors account for a smaller share of borrowing by
nonfinancial corporations than during the GFC. Ebeke et al. (2021) simulates the relief
provided by government measures to a sample of 4 million European nonfinancial
corporations. Assuming different sectoral shocks, the authors find these measures to have
been effective in mitigating job destruction and liquidity issues. The focus of Aiyar et al.
(2021) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2021) is
on whether the European banking system would be able to absorb the expected increase of
nonperforming loans (NPLs). In both cases, the answer seems to be positive, without
excluding some potential difficulties of certain banks breaching the requirement for the
maximum distributable amount, in particular for hybrid forms of capital.
What emerges from the analyses above is that the COVID-19 pandemic is generating
substantial economic losses, which would need to be absorbed by one or various economic
sectors at some point. In this regard, governments’ policy measures (such as debt moratoria,
loan guarantees, and other initiatives of a fiscal nature) can be seen as allocating these
economic losses across sectors (for example, loan guarantees imply a share of possible future
credit losses between banks and governments) and over time (for example, loan moratoria
may provide some relief to borrowers in the repayment of their loans).
In this paper, we contribute to the effort to quantify the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
by using an approach based on stylized balance sheets and inflows and outflows for each
economic sector. The ultimate objective is to gauge the degree to which different economic
agents are differently affected and whether the banking system, as main lender for
nonfinancial corporations and households, could absorb the related losses. Our paper places
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itself close to Gourinchas et al. (2020); Aiyar et al. (2021); Mojon, Rees, and Schmieder
(2021); and the OECD (2021).
At this stage, it is important to make a methodological clarification. We do not consider cash
flows but rather inflows and outflows. Cash flows require that cash (or cash equivalents)
enter or leave the economic agent and, as such, do not include changes in valuations of
financial assets or changes in pension liabilities. These are important wealth channels for
households, and we want to consider them in our paper as well. Therefore, our inflows and
outflows are close to the concept of “economic flows” used in national accounts. According
to the United Nations (UN) System of National Accounts, “economic flows” reflect the
creation, transformation, exchange, transfer, or extinction of economic value; they involve
changes in the volume, composition, or value of an institutional unit’s assets and liabilities
(UN 2009).
We provide answers to four important questions related to the shock the COVID-19
pandemic has caused: (1) which sectors of activity are most affected by the pandemic, and
what do these findings imply in terms of cross-country asymmetric impacts; (2) how much
can nonfinancial corporations and households lose as a result of the pandemic, and how does
the evolution of the pandemic determine these losses; (3) what do these losses mean for
solvency of the real economy in the coming months, and which portion of these losses can
become NPLs on banks’ balance sheet; and (4) given their current (non-risk-weighted)
capital levels, the capacity of banks to absorb losses triggered by NPLs. Looking at available
data for the euro area (cutoff date for our analysis is the second quarter of 2021) and drawing
on the accounting information for each economic sector, we provide an estimate of the
magnitude and shape of the shock the COVID-19 pandemic caused. These estimates should
not be seen as accurate predictions but rather as an indication of the size of the issues at
stake.
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the inflows of economic agents (for example, through
a reduction in sales of nonfinancial corporations), resulting in large negative changes in their
net worth. These negative changes in net worth may translate into solvency issues, as the
balance sheets of economic agents may deteriorate to the point of putting their long-term
financial sustainability into question. Despite the development of vaccines, it has
increasingly been recognized that it may take almost two more years to overcome the
COVID-19 pandemic and that its effects may be more structural in terms of changes in global
production processes or changes in preferences of economic agents than initially thought.3
Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic shock is also affecting existing economic relationships
in both the real economy and the financial sector, such as those related to organizational
capital, human capital, and the provision of credit. A long-lasting disruption in these
economic relationships could have permanent and severe effects, hampering the growth
path over the long term. In other words, there is still a lot of uncertainty about the long-term

For example, a decline in investment, if temporary, may not have permanent consequences for technological
development, but an extended period of low investment would have serious effects on innovation and
(potential) growth.
3
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structural “scars” left by the pandemic on economic activity, a relevant topic that falls,
however, outside the scope of our paper.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the four main economic
sectors (nonfinancial corporations, households, financial intermediaries, and government),
and the third section discusses how the COVID-19 pandemic (or any virus-driven pandemic,
in general) impacts the balance sheet and the inflows and outflows of the first two of these
sectors. Section IV deepens the analysis by estimating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
under several scenarios and provides estimates of NPLs generated by the pandemic. Section
V considers whether the banking sector may be resilient enough to absorb the related
impact, based on the excess own funds from the binding prudential leverage ratio
requirement. Section VI concludes. Several appendixes provide additional information on
our analysis.

II.

A Stylized View of the Main Economic Sectors

We start with an economy composed of four sectors: households, nonfinancial corporations,
financial intermediaries, and the government. For clarity, we do not consider the external
sector or banks, insurers, pension funds, and investment funds separately, but as part of the
same sector (financial intermediaries). Each of these sectors has a balance sheet with assets
and liabilities (including net worth as the difference between assets and liabilities), and it is
subject of inflows and outflows. The difference between them determines the changes in net
worth. Net worth is a central concept in our assessment of the economic impact of the COVID19 pandemic. It is indeed a fundamental variable to understand the allocation of credit in an
economy as well as the channels through which shocks can be amplified or extended over
time (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997).4
The balance sheet of each sector is considered on a consolidated basis and is described in
further detail in the paragraphs below. Appendix A complements this information, adding
data for the whole euro area as of the end of 2019. We consider the most relevant items in
terms of size, interconnections with other sectors, and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and
the related policy measures.

4 In the case of bank lending, a reduction in the value of durable assets diminishes the net worth of the economic

agent, resulting in a lower value of assets available to be used as collateral in loans. Borrowers’ credit limits are
determined by assets to be pledged as collateral: the higher these assets, the higher the borrower’s lending
possibilities. In economic crises, the interaction between credit limits and asset prices multiplies the initial
shock because of reduced credit and reduced asset values. In general terms, the higher the net worth of a
potential borrower, the less pronounced are agency problems in the form of moral hazard and adverse
selection. A reduction in net worth thus aggravates agency problems, and the resulting frictions might
negatively affect entire segments in the financial markets. This holds true particularly if economic agents are
hit by an aggregate shock that is beyond their control and if standard sorting and screening mechanisms
focused on idiosyncratic risks reach their limits. In the field of monetary policy, Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
stress the potential impact of changes in monetary policy on borrowers’ balance sheets and income statements,
including variables such as net worth, cash flows, and liquid assets.
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Households. Their balance sheet comprises real estate, financial assets, pension rights, and
other assets on the assets side, and mortgages, other loans, and future tax liabilities on the
liabilities side. Households receive inflows from their work (wages), interest and dividends
from the financial assets they own, and transfers from the government (such as
unemployment benefit or pensions). Their main outflows are consumption, taxes, and the
repayment of mortgages and other loans. The difference between their inflows and outflows
can be seen as their savings for the period, affecting their net worth on the liabilities side of
their balance sheet.
Nonfinancial corporations. Their main assets are fixed assets, inventories (only in case of
industrial nonfinancial corporations), receivables, financial assets, and cash. On the liabilities
side, they have loans from banks, bonds, payables to suppliers, pension obligations, future
tax liabilities, and shares and other equity. In terms of inflows, the main sources are sales
(comprising sales of final products, the provision of services, sales of intermediate products
to other nonfinancial corporations, and public consumption), funding for investment, and
transfers from governments (for example, grants). Their main outflows are wages,
depreciation of fixed assets, interest on loans and bonds, and dividends paid to shareholders.
The difference between inflows and outflows can be seen as the profit for the period.
Financial intermediaries. They have loans, bonds, and shares in the asset side of their balance
sheet, and deposits, technical reserves, pension obligations, bonds, and shares and other
equity on the liabilities side. The composition of the balance sheet reflects the heterogeneity
of business models and institutions considered in this sector.5 As inflows, the main ones are
interest from mortgages and other loans, dividends from their holdings of shares, insurance
premia, and net valuation gains (which include gains from trading with financial assets, asset
management fees and other fees). Their main outflows are wages, interest on deposits and
bonds, loan losses, insurance claims, and dividends paid to their shareholders. As with
nonfinancial corporations, the difference between inflows and outflows is the profit for the
period (or the change in net wealth).
Government. Its balance sheet reflects the present value of fees and taxes to be collected, fixed
assets, and shares on the asset side, and pension rights, bonds, and other liabilities on the
liabilities side. The main inflow government takes is the flow of taxes and fees, which
depends on the overall level of economic activity. Its main outflows are interest on bonds,
wages, public consumption, public investment, and transfers to households and nonfinancial
corporations. The difference between inflows and outflows generates a deficit when it is
negative (which would then need to be funded with sovereign debt) and a surplus when it is
positive.

Like nonfinancial corporations, financial intermediaries could also have fixed assets and real estate on the
asset side of their balance sheet, particularly insurance corporations and pension funds. We do not consider
them, for the sake of simplicity.
5
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III. The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nonfinancial
Corporations and Households
This section provides a stylized view of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related
health measures on nonfinancial corporations and households. The findings can also be
applied to other pandemics driven by a contagious virus or pathogen. For completeness, the
impacts on the government sector and on the external sector are briefly described in
Appendix B.
A. Nonfinancial Corporations: A Reduction in Revenues from Lower Consumption
Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, strict health measures were put in place
(and some are still in place) to contain the spread of the virus and alleviate the stress in
health infrastructure. However, such measures (many of which restrict the mobility of the
population) have led to an important reduction in economic activity. On top of that,
households have also adjusted to the risk of infection and have considered changes in their
behavior in relation to social distancing (for example, in their leisure activities).
The first immediate consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and of the related health
measures limiting movement of populations has been a sharp reduction in consumption
(Battistini and Stoevsky 2020; CCSA 2020; Kohlscheen, Mojon, and Rees 2020). An increase
in precautionary savings in response to the uncertainty about the future has also been
observed. The reduction of consumption has been particularly acute in nonessential goods
and services that cannot be consumed from home (for example, cars or traveling). That is an
important distinction to be made, as the consumption of essential goods and services (for
example, food) has not been reduced. There is also a third category of goods and services for
which consumption may have increased: those that are both nonessential and can be
consumed from home (for example, online TV). The impact of the pandemic is more acute in
the first category and more nuanced in the other two.
Furthermore, there is a differential impact in the case of nonfinancial corporations providing
services or producing goods. Nonfinancial corporations providing services are not able to
recover the services not provided during the pandemic (meaning a loss for the whole
economy) while industrial sectors may recover their lower sales with higher consumption
once the pandemic is over. Moreover, there can be disruptions in global supply chains,
derived from the closing of borders, the discontinuation of the production of intermediate
goods, and disruptions in transportation.
The decrease of consumption implies a sharp drop in the revenues of nonfinancial
corporations. Based on their flows, nonfinancial corporations may react to the decline by
increasing other sources of inflows or by decreasing some outflows. From the other two
sources of inflows, capital inflows do not seem to have increased during the COVID-19
pandemic while transfers from the government have materially grown, as support to
nonfinancial corporations has been one of the main policy targets of governments. Looking
at outflows, temporary or permanent layoffs decrease wages paid and compensate the
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reduction in revenues, while interest on loans and bonds seems more problematic to reduce.
If we assume that dividends paid depend on the generation of profit and do not take place
during the pandemic, and that the amortization of tangible goods is still going on, it seems
difficult to avoid a sharp reduction in net worth of nonfinancial corporations. In a longerterm perspective, nonfinancial corporations can adjust to lower revenues through
postponement of investments, a reduction of purchases from their suppliers, or with
additional debt to cover working capital. Furthermore, as precautionary savings have
increased, consumption decisions may be postponed until the pandemic is over. This
decision is particularly important for sectors such as real estate, where the transaction price
is high in comparison with the disposable income of households.
On that basis, we set the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial corporations in sector s as
a function of two factors: (1) whether the related good or service is essential, and (2)
whether it can be consumed remotely.
If we assume a multiplicative relation,6 we get:
1

(1)

𝐼𝑃 𝑠 = 𝐸𝑆𝑠 𝑥 𝑅𝐸𝑠

where 𝐼𝑃 𝑠 refers to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in sector s, and 𝐸𝑆 𝑠 and 𝑅𝐸 𝑠 are
indexes measuring how essential the good or service provided by sector s is and how much
it can be consumed remotely, respectively. Sectors with higher values of 𝐼𝑃 𝑠 see a higher
impact on their revenues, while sectors providing essential goods or services and those that
can be consumed remotely are less affected.7
Moving from the sectoral impact to the impact on total nonfinancial corporations, we
compute the weighted average of the impacts in different sectors:
𝐼𝑃𝑁𝐹𝐶 = ∑𝑆𝑠=1 𝐼𝑃 𝑠 𝑥

𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑠

(2)

𝑠
∑𝑆
𝑠=1 𝐺𝑉𝐴

where 𝐼𝑃𝑁𝐹𝐶 denotes the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial corporations in a given
economy, 𝐼𝑃 𝑠 is the impact of the pandemic in sector s and GVAs refers to the gross value
added of sector s, which is used to compute weights of the different sectors in an economy.
A third factor to consider in the computation of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
nonfinancial corporations, which is missing from Equation 2, refers to how each sector is
interconnected with others: the more interconnected a sector is, the stronger the spillovers
to other sectors and the larger the potential impact on financial stability. For example, if real
6 The

impact with an additive relation would be dependent on the good or service being consumed remotely or
being essential, while with a multiplicative relation, both conditions need to be met to have low impact. This
explains our preference for a multiplicative relation.
7 Particularly in the case of goods or services to be provided remotely, there can be substantial tensions within
sectors, with nonfinancial corporations more apt to operate remotely gaining market share at the expense of
those less developed from a technological point of view. In our analysis, we stop at the level of sector, not
considering these intrasectoral tensions.
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estate sectors are severely affected and found to have unaddressed vulnerabilities, the
subsequent related shock can propagate to households (through a negative wealth effect)
and to financial intermediaries (banks through collateral values and direct exposures,
investment funds through the positions of real estate funds, and insurance corporations and
pension funds through holding of real estate assets). For the purposes of our analysis though,
we do not consider these second-round effects.
B. An Estimation of the Asymmetric Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Nonfinancial Corporations
To illustrate the heterogenous impact that the COVID-19 pandemic has had across the world,
depending on the structure of national economies, we compute the impact of the pandemic
according to Equation 2.
Starting with the identification of essential activities, we follow the approach by Del RioChanona et al. (2020) and use the identification made by the Italian government in its decree
of March 22, 2020 (Italian Government 2020).8 Then, for the large sectors (at the level of
one-letter NACE industry classification codes), we compute 𝐸𝑆 𝑠 as the number of activities
referred to as essential by the Italian government divided by the total number of activities in
that sector. We use four-letter NACE codes for these purposes and exclude activities carried
out by the public sector (O: public administration and defense; compulsory social security;
P: education; Q: human health and social work activities), activities related to financial
services (K: financial and insurance services), and those with an unclear economic relevance
(T: activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing
activities of households for own use; U: activities of extraterritorial organizations and
bodies).
As a result, we compute an index of the degree to which each sector is essential for the
economy, on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher values being associated with the sector being
fully essential (Figure 1). We observe first an important heterogeneity, as together with
several sectors performing essential activities (five of 15), four sectors obtain the minimum
possible score.
To compute which goods and services can be provided and consumed remotely, we consider
the degree to which it is possible for a potential customer to consume the good or service
from home. We attribute a value of 1 to those sectors in which goods or services can be
consumed from home without any need of substantial adjustments. Given the variety of
activities included in the main NACE categories, the assessment made below in Figure 1 must
be taken as an approximation, with an important role played by judgement.

The Italian government’s decree of March 22, 2020, called for the suspension of productive activities, except
for those sectors considered essential.
8
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Figure 1: Goods and Services Considered Essential (blue bars) and That Can Be
Consumed Remotely (yellow bars)
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Notes: The blue bars show the ratio between the number of sectors mentioned as essential in the decree of the
Italian government of March 22, 2020, and the total number of sectors, at four-letter detail, in each of the main
sectoral divisions in the NACE code. Higher values represent that the sector is performing activities perceived
as more essential. The yellow bars represent the degree to which the representative good or service provided
by each sector can be consumed remotely in an easy manner.
Sources: Italian Government 2020; author’s elaboration.

To calculate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic for each sector according to Equation 2,
we replace those values of 0 for 0.01, to avoid getting undetermined expressions. Figure 28
in Appendix C shows the results per sector.
Given that the weight of the sectors in national economies varies across countries, the
COVID-19 pandemic has had and will have an asymmetrical impact across countries. To
illustrate this point, we use the data published by Eurostat on gross value added by NACE
codes for the euro area economies at the end of 2019.9 The left panel of Figure 2 shows the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on nonfinancial corporations in euro area economies
according to Equation (2), weighting the different sectors in terms of gross value added.
There is substantial cross-country heterogeneity, as those countries most affected show an
impact almost twice as large as countries least affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The right
panel of Figure 2 compares these impacts with the change in real GDP between the end of
2019 and the third quarter of 2020, finding a clear negative relationship.

There are fewer sectors reported by Eurostat than in the main NACE categories. To compute Figure 2, we
made some adjustments, as detailed in Appendix C.
9
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Figure 2: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nonfinancial Corporations in the Euro
Area
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Notes: The left panel shows the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in each country, according to the impacts
defined in Equation (2) and the weight of each sector in the national gross value added. The right panel
compares this impact with the real GDP growth rate during the first three quarters of 2020 in volumes. No data
for Slovakia.
Sources: Eurostat 2022a; author’s elaboration.
C.

Households: Impact Determined by Wages and Consumption

In principle, only those households that have lost their jobs as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic can experience a large decline in their inflows while other households may be less
affected and may even increase their net worth (and savings) in view of the lower
consumption opportunities. Amid workers, those with a temporary contract (typically the
positions with lowest remuneration and employing the younger generations) face the
greatest risk of losing their jobs. Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2020) finds that the hardest-hit
occupations are those with relatively low flexibility in terms of substitutability with remote
work and higher social contact intensity, which tend to be associated with relatively poorer
individuals (in terms of both wage and liquid wealth). Del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) classifies
industries as essential or nonessential and constructs a Remote Labor Index, measuring the
ability of different occupations to work from home.10 Sectors such as transport are more
likely to have output constrained by demand shocks while manufacturing, mining, and
services are more likely to be constrained by supply shocks. Entertainment, restaurants, and
tourism face both large supply and demand shocks. At the occupation level, the authors
confirm that high-wage professions are relatively immune from adverse supply- and
demand-side shocks while low-wage jobs are much more vulnerable.
To understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the household sector, it is necessary
to consider also the potential loss of value of assets on the balance sheet of the sector.11 The
value of bonds and equities of nonfinancial corporations may decrease as a result of the fall

10
11

Barrot, Grassi, and Sauvagnat (2020) offers a similar index but with a smaller breakdown by occupations.
This dynamic appears also in the case of nonfinancial corporations, although with less intensity.
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in consumption, affecting those households holding these financial instruments directly or
indirectly (through investment funds or, more importantly, insurance and pension
products). In addition to these securities, real estate is the largest asset on the balance sheet
of households and is usually associated with a large liability (mortgage loans). A drop in the
value of real estate can thus have dramatic consequences for the financial soundness of
households.
Those households losing their jobs and facing limited unemployment insurance may witness
a reduction of their inflows that is larger than their ability to reduce consumption of
nonessential goods. In addition to existing unemployment benefits and the indemnities to be
paid for the extinction of a labor contract, many governments have taken measures
supporting workers in the form of shared payment of wages combined with temporal breaks
in the work. Policy measures for households have been targeting the protection of those jobs
at risk (through furlough or tax reliefs, for example) and the avoidance of default in loan
repayments for the most vulnerable borrowers (essentially through loan moratoria).
In aggregated terms, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on households seems to operate
in both directions. On the one hand, there is a decrease in wages deriving from the
adjustments by employers in their workforces, but on the other hand, consumption is
decreasing significantly, given the difficulty in maintaining previous levels of economic
activity, and precautionary savings are increasing. Besides, accumulated net worth should
be able to absorb losses derived from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the aggregation
hides the cross-sectoral heterogeneity of the financial soundness of households, as those
with higher income tend to have higher net worth and be less indebted.12
We define the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on households as a function of the share of
workforce affected by the decrease in employment:
1

𝐼𝑃𝐻 = ∑𝑆𝑠=1 𝐸𝑆𝑠 𝑥 𝑅𝐸𝑠 𝑥

𝑒𝑠

(3)

𝑒

where 𝐼𝑃𝐻 refers to the impact of the pandemic on households, es is the number of employees
in sector s, e is the total number of employees in nonfinancial corporations, and 𝐸𝑆 𝑠 and 𝑅𝐸 𝑠
are indexes measuring how essential the good or service provided by sector s is and how
much they can be consumed remotely, as defined in Section III.A.
As a continuation of the example in the previous section, we use data on compensation of
employees by sector as published by Eurostat to compute the parameter es and then calculate
the impact of the pandemic on households across euro area countries, as per Equation (3).
Figure 3 shows the resulting impact. Given the similarities between Equation (2) and
Equation (3) (obvious, given the close interrelations between the financial soundness of

For a detailed analysis of the household sector in the euro area, please refer to Household Finance and
Consumption Network (2020).
12
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households and nonfinancial corporations through employment relations), the ranking of
countries is very similar to the one in the left panel of Figure 2.
Figure 3: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Households of the Euro Area
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Notes: The blue bars show the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in each country, according to the impacts
defined in Equation (3) on the basis of the compensation of employees reported for each sector of activity. No
data for France, Germany, and Slovakia.
Sources: Eurostat 2022a; author’s elaboration.

D. The Nature and Extent of Government Support
The COVID-19 pandemic, particularly as a result of the long period of reduced economic
activity, has triggered an ambitious policy response by governments around the world since
2020. Government support measures have mainly targeted households and nonfinancial
corporations, protecting their main sources of inflows (wages and sales). Loan guarantees
are important to ensure that nonfinancial corporations keep their access to bank loans to
meet their financing needs, which in a pandemic context could also cover their working
capital. Loan moratoria seek to provide relief to those borrowers that have seen a substantial
decline in their inflows by postponing the payments related to their bank loans. Other types
of support measures comprise tax reliefs, equity injections, or direct grants to the most
affected segments in the real economy. The other side of these ambitious support measures
implies an increase in government deficits, which are expected to persist for some time.
In addition to government support measures, automatic stabilizers are at work to support
the real economy during the crisis. For households, unemployment benefits provide inflows
to workers who have lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic, and the lower generation of
rents also imply that less taxes will be collected by the government. Nonfinancial
corporations reporting losses for the year 2020 would not pay income taxes, for example.

111

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 3

Considering the stylized balance sheets and flows statements of our economy, it is worth
noting that loan moratoria do not imply any expense or transfer for the government, as they
represent a deferral of interest payments over time. Loan moratoria involve mainly banks
and borrowers, with a small role played by the government. In the case of loan guarantees,
the government needs to intervene only if the borrower defaults in its payments to banks.
So, the transfer from the government to banks is conditional to the default event of the
borrower. If the borrower does not default, there is no impact for the government. In
addition to the automatic stabilizers, tax reliefs and direct grants do have an impact on
government flows and increase its deficit. Equity injections also determine a transfer from
the government to nonfinancial corporations, but in this case, the government takes a
participation in the nonfinancial corporation (it owns it, at least partially), which can
generate inflows, in the form of dividends, in the future.
In Europe, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) have looked at the nature and uptake of the support measures taken by governments
(EBA 2020a; ESRB 2021a). Loan guarantees have been used mostly by nonfinancial
corporations while loan moratoria have benefited borrowers in the household sector in a
larger proportion than nonfinancial corporations. Large heterogeneity in the design of the
measures across countries, also reaching the uptake of them, has been observed. While
cross-country differences may seem small (for example, loan guarantees for 70% of the loan
or for the full loan, or covering only two years or the whole maturity of the loan), they can
have important effects on their effectiveness to address stress in the real economy.
It is beyond our scope to discuss the adequacy of government measures or their effectiveness
in detail. However, as we see later in Section IV, the size and the effectiveness of government
measures can strongly mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy.

IV.

From the Impact on the Real Economy to Nonperforming
Loans

In the previous section, we separately analyzed the channels through which the pandemic
can impact households and nonfinancial corporations, and we would like ultimately to assess
the resilience of the banking system to an increase in NPLs. In this section, we link these two
important issues.
We start with a framework for the default of a nonfinancial corporation or a household on
its bank loan payments. We do so by looking at the main items in the flow statements. In a
second step, we compute the amount of new NPLs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in the
euro area. In that process, we design several scenarios for the evolution of the pandemic
during 2021, considering various sizes of government support. We finish with an analysis of
corporate insolvencies and how they may affect NPLs in the household sector, as a result of
job destruction directly caused by these insolvencies.
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A. Conditions for the Default of Bank Loan Payments by Nonfinancial Corporations
and Households
Based on its balance sheet and the inflows and outflows, we consider that a nonfinancial
corporation i would not pay back its loans if:
̂𝑠 ) + 𝑇𝑅 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖 + 𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑖
𝐼𝐿𝑖 > 𝑆 𝑖 𝑥 (1 − 𝐼𝑃

(4)

̂𝑠 to the impact of the pandemic
where IL refers to the interest paid on loans, S to the sales, 𝐼𝑃
on the sector of activity of the nonfinancial corporation, TR to transfers from the government,
IF to inflows, OF to outflows, and SFA to inflows from the sale of fixed assets.
The interest of the loans is determined by the volume of loans in the liabilities side of the
balance sheet and by the interest rate of the loans. If we define the debt ratio as the share of
debt over total assets, then Equation (4) can be expressed as:
̂𝑠 )
𝑆 𝑖 𝑥 (1−𝐼𝑃

1

𝐷𝑅 𝑖 > 𝑟 𝑖 𝑥 (

𝑇𝐴𝑖

𝑇𝑅 𝑖

+ 𝑇𝐴𝑖 +

𝐼𝐹𝑖 −𝑂𝐹𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

+

𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

)

(5)

where, in addition to the variables defined above, DR refers to the debt ratio, TA to total
assets, and r to the interest rate of the loans.
Operating further, we can express the same condition as in Equation (5) with the impact of
the pandemic on the left side of the inequality:
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑆𝐹𝐴
̂𝑠 > 𝑇𝐴𝑖 𝑥 (𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝑆 +𝐼𝐹 −𝑂𝐹
𝐼𝑃
+
− (𝐷𝑅 𝑖 𝑥 𝑟 𝑖 ))
𝑖
𝑆
𝑇𝐴
𝑇𝐴
𝑇𝐴𝑖

(6)

Together with the impact of the pandemic, the main factors driving the recognition of NPLs
are the existing indebtedness of the nonfinancial corporation (that is, its debt ratio), the
interest rate paid on the stock of loans, the transfers received from the government, and the
ability to dispose of fixed assets to generate inflows.
Looking at the government support, the main measures are loan moratoria, loan guarantees,
and direct transfers. The first effort implies that there is no interest payment due, so the loan
cannot become nonperforming. Loan guarantees ensure that there are additional loans to
finance the operations of the nonfinancial corporation, thus increasing its debt ratio and its
inflows. Finally, direct transfers are seen in Equation (6) as an increase in the term TRi.
Considering that there are N nonfinancial corporations in a sector, we can identify a number
I of them that would fulfil Equation (6) and then default on their loans. Consequently, at the
level of the sector s, the new arising NPLs would be equal to:
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 = ∑𝐼𝑖=1 𝑇𝐿𝑖

(7)

where 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 refers to the additional amount of nonperforming loans and TL to total loans.
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Similarly, NPLs arise in the household sector if the following condition is met:
𝐷𝑅 𝑗 >

̂𝐻 )+𝑇𝑅𝑗 +𝐼𝐹𝑗 −𝑂𝐹𝑗 +𝑆𝐴𝑗
𝑊 𝑗 𝑥 (1−𝐼𝑃

(8)

𝑇𝐴𝑗 𝑥 𝑟 𝑗

where 𝐷𝑅 𝑗 refers to the debt ratio of a household j, W to the wages received by that
̂𝐻 to the impact of the pandemic on the household sector, TR to transfers from
household, 𝐼𝑃
the government, IF to inflows, OF to outflows, SA to the inflows derived from the sale of assets
on the balance sheet of households (real estate, financial assets, pension and insurance
rights, and other assets), TA to total assets, and r to the interest rate of household loans.
In Equation (8), we also need to account for the lower consumption of households, which
should decrease their outflows. We then introduce the impact of the pandemic on
nonfinancial corporations as follows:
𝐷𝑅 𝑗 >

̂𝐻 )+𝑇𝑅𝑗 +𝐼𝐹𝑗 −( 𝐶𝑂𝑗 𝑥 (1−(𝛽 𝑥 𝐼𝑃̂
𝑁𝐹𝐶 )))−𝑂𝑂𝐹𝑗 +𝑆𝐴 𝑗
𝑊 𝑗 𝑥 (1−𝐼𝑃

(9)

𝑇𝐴𝑗 𝑥 𝑟 𝑗

𝑁𝐹𝐶 refers to the impact of the
̂
where, in addition to the variables defined for Equation 8, 𝐼𝑃
COVID-19 pandemic on the total sector of nonfinancial corporations, 𝛽 is a coefficient related
to the reduction in consumption stemming from the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial
corporations, and OOF refers to outflows other than consumption.

We rearrange Equation (9) to bring the impact of the pandemic to the left side of the
inequality:
𝑗

̂𝐻 > 1 + 𝐼𝐹 −
𝐼𝑃
𝑊𝑗

𝐶𝑂𝑗
𝑊𝑗

−

𝑂𝑂𝐹𝑗
𝑊𝑗

+

𝑁𝐹𝐶
𝐶𝑂 𝑗 𝑥 𝛽 𝑥 𝐼𝑃̂

𝑊𝑗

+

𝑇𝑅 𝑗
𝑊𝑗

+

𝑆𝐴𝑗

− (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗 𝑥
𝑊𝑗

𝑟𝑗
𝑊𝑗

) (10)

The equation above takes into account the financial soundness with which households
entered the pandemic (seen through their level of debt) as well as the difference between
inflows and outflows. Government support measures for households work by sustaining
their wages (through temporal compensation schemes) and as transfers (for example,
unemployment benefits).
Considering that there are N households in the economy, we can identify a number J of them
that would fulfil Equation (10). Consequently, new NPLs related to household loans would
be equal to:
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐻 = ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑇𝐿𝑗

(11)

where 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐻 refers to the amount of NPLs from loans to households and TL to total loans. At
the level of the economy, the total amount of NPLs is the sum of those arising from
nonfinancial corporations and those from the household sector:
(12)

𝑁𝑃𝐿 = ∑𝑆𝑠=1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐻
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B. Estimating the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nonfinancial Corporations in
the Euro Area
We compute the impact of the pandemic on euro area nonfinancial corporations using shortterm statistics prepared by Eurostat over the period March to December 2020 (Eurostat
2022c).13 Short-term statistics provide an index of turnover by main NACE codes. We need
to slightly adjust the sectoral division of nonfinancial corporations we have used so far (see
Table 8 in Appendix C).
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic over each sector is computed as lost turnover since
February 2020, according to the following expression:
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2020

𝑠

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅𝑠

(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 −𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 )
2020
̂𝑠 = (∑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ
)
𝐼𝑃
2019
𝑠
∑

(13)

𝐹𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 2020 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡

̂𝑠 represents the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on sector s, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑠 the value of
where 𝐼𝑃
the index according to the short-term indicators by Eurostat for sector s, and ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑠 the
value taken by the index in February 2020.
Figure 4 shows that the largest impacts are found in the sectors of accommodation and food
service activities, administrative and support service activities, arts, entertainment and
recreation, and other services activities.14 Using the weight of each sector on the total gross
value added by nonfinancial corporations, the total impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
euro area is –12.21%. That result implies that the pandemic, between March and December
2020, led to a decrease of 12.21% in the turnover of euro area nonfinancial corporations,
based on the turnover of the previous 12 months (March 2019 to February 2020).

Sectoral annual accounts are available only for the euro area. Although Eurostat publishes data for the
European Union (EU) as a whole as well, we are computing the impact of the pandemic on the euro area to
cross-check our results with the sectoral balance sheets in Appendix A.
14 For a comparison with our impact of the pandemic according to Equation (1), see Appendix C.
13
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Figure 4: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Turnover of Nonfinancial
Corporations
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Notes: Data are seasonally and calendar adjusted. The blue bars represent the change in total turnover per
sector, computed according to Equation (13). See Appendix C for the mapping of sectors in Eurostat data. Data
for sectors H, J, M, and N for October, November, and December 2020 are computed as the average of the
observations for Spain, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland, as Eurostat had
not published the euro area aggregate in April 2021. The chart on the right represents the contribution of each
sector to the overall impact, using weights of gross value added. A stands for agriculture, forestry, and fishing;
B for mining and quarrying; C for manufacturing; D for electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E for
water supply, sewerage, and waste management and remediation activities; F for construction; G for wholesale
and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; H for transporting and storage; I for
accommodation and food service activities; J for information and communication services; L for real estate
activities; M for professional, scientific, and technical activities; N for administrative and support service
activities; R for arts, entertainment, and recreation; and S for other services activities.
Source: Eurostat 2022c; author’s analysis.

Up to this point, we have implicitly assumed that turnover returned to the level of February
2020 in January 2021, an assumption that unfortunately did not hold. The assessment above
offers a partial view of the impact, and it is necessary to complement it by taking into account
the evolution of the pandemic from January 2021.
To that purpose, we compute first the stringency index by the University of Oxford, which
measures the severity of the health-related measures taken by governments to contain the
COVID-19 pandemic (Hale et al. 2020). We then calculate the correlation between the
median stringency index for euro area countries (taking the average values for each month)
and the turnover of the different sectors of activity, as reported by Eurostat. These
correlations are negative for all sectors of activity and, in some of them until September
2020, close to –1 (Figure 5). The decrease of correlations when we consider data up to
December 2020 may suggest that nonfinancial corporations were able to adjust to the
pandemic and were, thus, not so much affected as in the first half of 2020.
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Figure 5: Correlations between the Stringency Index and the Short-Term Indicators
by Eurostat
Correlation
Sector

Up to Sept
2020

Up to Dec
2020

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

–0.96

–0.74

Mining and quarrying

–0.88

–0.64

Manufacturing

–0.89

–0.60

Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply

–0.65

–0.39

Water supply, sewerage, and waste management and
remediation activities

–0.65

–0.39

Construction

–0.73

–0.58

Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles

–0.78

–0.60

Transporting and storage

–0.96

–0.74

Accommodation and food service activities

–0.94

–0.94

Information and communication services

–0.43

–0.48

Real estate activities

–0.73

–0.58

Professional, scientific, and technical activities

–0.87

–0.43

Administrative and support service activities

–0.93

–0.86

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

–0.93

–0.86

Other services activities

–0.93

–0.86

Notes: Correlations between the values of the stringency index (median of monthly data across euro area
countries) and of the short-term indicators by Eurostat, considering two periods of time: from January 2020 to
September 2020, and from January 2020 to December 2020. Some sectors are missing in the Eurostat database
and have been mapped as shown in Appendix C.
Sources: Eurostat 2022c; Hale et al. 2020; author’s elaboration.

We estimate a simple linear regression where the turnover index is the dependent variable,
and the stringency index is the independent variable.
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑠 = 𝛼 𝑠 + (𝛽 𝑠 𝑥 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑡𝑠

(14)

where 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑠 represents the turnover index after December 2020, 𝛼 𝑠 the intersect, 𝛽 𝑠 is the
coefficient associated with the stringency index, Stringencyt the value taken by the stringency
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index, and 𝜀𝑡𝑠 the error term. The resulting equation for each sector allows us to forecast the
evolution of the turnover index over 2021, based on the values taken by the stringency index.
We define the following scenarios for the evolution of the pandemic in 2021 (Figure 6):
Mild. The stringency index remains in the values of December 2020 during January,
February, and March, then decreases linearly until reaching the value zero in June 2021.
We can use this scenario as a floor for our estimations.
Severe. The stringency index remains in the values of December 2020 during January,
February, March, and April and then decreases linearly until reaching the value zero in
December 2021. The slower reduction in the stringency index under this scenario can
be seen also in the context of a slower-than-expected vaccination process or the
appearance of new mutations of the virus.
Spanish flu. Like the situation in 1918–1919, the pandemic hits in three waves (CDC
2018), the third one occurring between March and April 2021, with the stringency index
taking the same value as in April 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic follows closely that of
the Spanish flu and ends in December 2021.
Lockdown. There is a two-month lockdown in February and March 2021, with the
stringency index at its maximum value, then the pandemic abates quickly through
December 2021. This scenario can be compared with the others to see the impact of
strict lockdowns on economic activities over the long term.
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Figure 6: Stringency Index over 2021 in the Four Scenarios
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Notes: Each line represents the evolution of the stringency index over 2021, as per the assumptions made in
the description of each of the four scenarios.
Source: Hale et al. 2020; author’s analysis.

We then compute Equation (13), extending the denominator until the period when the
stringency index is back to zero (June 2021 and December 2021). As observed in the left
panel of Figure 7, the decrease in total sales is slightly above 16% for the mild scenario (4
percentage points more than at the end of December 2020), almost 21% for the severe
scenario (doubling the loss until December 2020), and slightly above 22% for the Spanish
flu scenario. The lockdown scenario leads to a decline in sales of circa 19.5%, less than the
relatively similar severe and Spanish flu scenarios. That outcome could be seen as pointing
out to the benefits of strong responses to the pandemic, in opposition to a prolonged
pandemic where forceful measures are not taken. When the impact is defined in terms of the
accumulated net worth of nonfinancial corporations (using the data in Appendix A), the three
scenarios extending the pandemic until December 2021 consume about 30% of accumulated
net worth for the aggregate of nonfinancial corporations (right panel of Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Decrease in Turnover of Nonfinancial Corporations in the Four Scenarios
for the COVID-19 Pandemic over 2021
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Notes: The left panel shows the change in turnover under the four scenarios (and up to December 2020) as a
percentage of the turnover between March 2019 and February 2020. The yellow bars in the right panel show
the size of the lost turnover as a share of the accumulated net worth on the balance sheet of nonfinancial
corporations at the end of 2019.
Source: Author’s analysis.

C.

Estimating the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Households in the Euro Area

To estimate the impact of the pandemic on households, we use data from Eurostat on weekly
absences from work in the European Union (EU; excluding the United Kingdom).15 Figure 8
shows the evolution of the weekly absences from work during 2018, 2019, and 2020. In
2020, many more absences from work were reported in March, April, and May, with a second
smaller peak toward the end of the year.

15

See Eurostat (2022b). Eurostat data do not show an aggregate for the euro area, so we use the EU as a proxy.
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Figure 8: Weekly Absences from Work in the EU
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Notes: Each line represents the weekly absences from work over the years 2018, 2019, and 2020, as reported
by Eurostat for the EU 27. The last observation is week 52, whereas 2020 had 53 weeks. Data for week 53 has
not been taken into account in our calculations.
Sources: Eurostat 2022b; author’s elaboration.

On that basis, we define the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on households as absences
from work in 2020 divided by the average of those reported in the two previous years (2018
and 2019):
𝑊52

̂𝐻 = − (
𝐼𝑃

2019 +∑𝑊52 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠2018 )
𝑊01
2
2019 +∑𝑊52 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠2018 )
(∑𝑊52
𝑊01 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑊01

(∑
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
2020 − 𝑊01
∑𝑊52
𝑊01 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠

)

(15)

2

̂𝐻 refers to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on households, 𝑊01 to the first
where 𝐼𝑃
week of the year, 𝑊52 to the last week of the year, and Absences2018, Absences2019, and
Absences2020 to the weekly absences from work for years 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively.
Absences from work were 31.68% higher in 2020, and we can attribute this increase to the
COVID-19 pandemic. That is the direct impact of the pandemic on households, without taking
into account important mitigants present in Equation (10): the extent of government
support (including unemployment benefits) and the reduction in consumption derived from
lower economic activity.
D. Estimating the Increase of Nonperforming Loans from Nonfinancial Corporations
in the Euro Area
In this section, we provide an answer to the question of how many NPLs can be expected to
arise from the economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, once the positive effects of
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the support measures taken by governments are taken into account. We base our estimations
on Equation (6) and Equation (10) for nonfinancial corporations and households, respectively.
Given our focus on the euro area, we consider two important additional points on nonfinancial
corporations: (1) bank lending is the main source of finance for nonfinancial corporations,
particularly if compared with the US (Pagano et al. 2014), so we do not consider other marketbased sources of funding; and (2) small and medium-size enterprises play a fundamental role
in the European economies, in terms of production, employment, investment, and value added
(European Commission 2019).
Starting with nonfinancial corporations, Figure 9 summarizes our main assumptions.
Because the results for the severe, Spanish flu, and lockdown scenarios are quite similar, we
consider only the severe scenario. For interest rates, we assume a value of 2%, based on the
monetary financial institutions interest rates (MIR) database of the European Central Bank
(ECB 2021b). The ratio between total assets and sales is calculated from the balance sheet of
the euro area economy, as in Appendix A.
For the debt ratio and the total inflows and outflows divided by total assets, we use data from
the Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized (BACH) database of the European
Committee of Central Balance Sheet Data Offices (ECCBSO).16 We use data from more than
2.2 million nonfinancial corporations located in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Slovakia with a reference date of the end of 2018 (data for 2019
is still being updated). These are the countries with the highest coverage in the BACH
database. The first and third quartiles and the median of each ratio are disclosed by country.
We calculate the median across countries to get to an approximation of the value for the euro
area.

Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized (BACH) is a database of aggregated and harmonized
accounting data of nonfinancial incorporated enterprises of 12 European countries, based on national
accounting standards (individual annual accounts) and maintained by the European Committee of Central
Balance Sheet Data Offices. For further information, see Bach Working Group (2015).
16
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Figure 9: Values Attributed to Main Variables in the Estimation of NPLs Arising from
the COVID-19 Pandemic in Relation to Loans to Nonfinancial Corporations
Variable

Value

Comments

̂𝑠
𝐼𝑃

Depends on
sector

As estimated in Section IV.B

𝑆𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

0.1096

Calculated from the amounts reported in Appendix A

𝑇𝑅 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

From 0 to
0.15

Seen as the most plausible amounts. Values greater than
10% of total assets imply transfers from the government
of more than EUR 6 trillion

𝑆 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖 Depends on
sector
𝑇𝐴𝑖
𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

𝐷𝑅 𝑖

𝑟𝑖

Ratio of net operating profit to total assets, from the BACH
database, estimated to follow a normal distribution

From 0 to
0.05

Depends on
sector

Sum of the ratios of current interest-bearing borrowings
to total assets and noncurrent interest-bearing
borrowings to total assets, from the BACH database,
estimated to follow a normal distribution. We exclude
amounts due to suppliers (typically the most relevant
short-term debt of nonfinancial corporations). Through
supplier relationships, nonfinancial corporations are
importantly interconnected across jurisdictions and
across sectors, the car industry being the clearest example
(see, for example, Baldwin and Lopez‐Gonzalez 2015).

0.02

Based on the Monetary Financial Institutions Interest Rate
(MIR) Statistics of the ECB, the agreed interest rates for
loans to nonfinancial corporations in the euro area, at all
maturities, was 1.87% in December 2019. We round it up
to 2%

Source: Bach Working Group 2015; ECB 2021b; and author’s analysis.

We assume that the ratio of net operating profit to total assets follows a normal distribution
across nonfinancial corporations in a given sector, with the median as the mean, and the
variance calculated from the interquartile range17:

In a standard normal distribution (with mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1), the first and
third quartiles are located at –0.67448 and +0.67448 respectively, leading to an interquartile range of 1.34896
(rounded to 1.35).
17
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≈ 𝑁(𝑄2, (

𝑄3−𝑄1 2
1.35

(16)

) )

where NOP refers to net operating profit, TA to total assets, and Q1, Q2, and Q3 to the first
quartile, the median, and the third quartile, respectively.
We make the same assumption for the ratio of current and noncurrent debt to total assets:
𝐶𝐷+𝑁𝐶𝐷
𝑇𝐴

𝑄3−𝑄1 2

≈ 𝑁(𝑄2, (

1.35

(17)

) )

where CD refers to current debt and NCD to noncurrent debt. In this case, we truncate the
range of values to be in the interval [0, 1], not allowing for debt to be larger than the total
size of the balance sheet and not considering negative values of the ratio. These cases appear
only at the left and right tails of the distribution, with low associated probabilities.
Next, we assume that both normal distributions are related: Those firms showing lower
values of the net operating profit to total assets are also having higher values of the debt
ratio. Similarly, nonfinancial corporations with higher profitability also have lower
associated values of the debt ratio.
For each sector of activity, we attribute values to the transfers from the government and to
the sale of fixed assets between 0 and 0.15, and between 0 and 0.05, respectively.18 There
are thus 96 different combinations, and for each one, we calculate Equation (6) for 600
values of the ratio of net operating profit to total assets and the related current and
noncurrent debt to total assets. These 600 values range from 3X to –3X the standard
deviation, at intervals of 0.01.
The increase in the rate of NPLs as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic is defined as the
difference of the probability associated with the last value of the ratio of net operating profit
to total assets for which Equation (6) holds and the same probability assuming that the
impact of the pandemic is zero:
𝑆 𝑖 +𝐼𝐹𝑖 −𝑂𝐹𝑖

∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [(

𝑇𝐴𝑖

∗

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

∗

̂𝑠 ] − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [(𝑆 +𝐼𝐹 −𝑂𝐹
) | 𝐼𝑃
) | 0]
𝑇𝐴𝑖

(18)
𝑆 𝑖 +𝐼𝐹𝑖 −𝑂𝐹𝑖

where ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠 refers to the increase in the rate of NPLs in sector s, (

𝑇𝐴𝑖

∗

) to the first

𝑆 𝑖 +𝐼𝐹𝑖 −𝑂𝐹𝑖

̂𝑠 to the impact of the pandemic on
value of
for which Equation (6) holds, and 𝐼𝑃
𝑇𝐴𝑖
sector s (Figure 10).

18 Appendix A

shows that nonfinancial corporations in the euro area received transfers amounting to about 1%
of their total assets in 2019. Given their small size and to ease our calculations, such transfers are not
considered in our estimation.
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𝑆𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖

𝑆𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖

∗

∗

̂𝑠
𝐼𝑃

𝑆 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

𝑠
𝐼𝑃̂
=0

𝑖
̂
𝐼𝑃 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖 𝑥
𝑆

𝑇𝑅 𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖 + 𝑆𝐹𝐴 𝑖 − 𝐷𝑅𝑖 𝑥 𝑟𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖

∗

Figure 10: Increase in the Rate of NPLs to Euro Area Nonfinancial Corporations from
the COVID-19 Pandemic

𝑃(𝑥)

∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑠
𝑆 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖

∗

𝑆𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴 𝑖

∗

𝑆 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

Notes: The diagonal line at the top of the chart shows the relation between the ratio of net operating profit to
total assets and the result of Equation (6), used to derive when a nonfinancial corporation would default on the
loans, with and without pandemic. The intersection of the two lines with the x-axis is then translated into the
cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution for the ratio of net operating profit to total assets. The
difference between the two associated cumulative probabilities is estimated to be the increase in NPLs
generated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Source: Author’s analysis.

Once the increase in the rate of NPLs is computed by sector, data from the EBA Risk
Dashboard (EBA 2020b) on loans to nonfinancial corporations according to NACE codes
allows us to obtain the weight of each sector on lending to nonfinancial corporations in the
euro area. Using these weights, we can obtain the increase in the rate of NPLs related to loans
to nonfinancial corporations in the euro area.
Figure 11 depicts the rate of nonperforming loans arising under the different combinations
of transfers from the government and sales of fixed assets. A situation where no government
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support is available, and no fixed assets are sold leads to additional NPLs of 7.81% of loans
to nonfinancial corporations (EUR 881 billion, according to data from Appendix A).
Figure 11: Increase in the Rate of NPLs to Euro Area Nonfinancial Corporations from
the COVID-19 Pandemic
9%
8%
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6%
5%
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0%
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4%

12%
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5%

Notes: The y-axis shows the increase, as a percentage of total loans, in the rate of NPLs that would be triggered
by the COVID-19 pandemic under different combinations of transfers from the government (x-axis) and
disposal of assets (see legend). Data refers to the euro area. Sector J (information and communication) is
excluded as it shows a small positive impact of the pandemic, which would result in a reduction of NPLs.
Source: Author’s analysis.

Government support measures are effective in reducing the amount of NPLs caused by the
pandemic. When transfers from the government represent 10% of total assets of
nonfinancial corporations and in the absence of any action on the side of nonfinancial
corporations, the additional NPLs are reduced to 3.28% (EUR 370 billion, according to data
from Appendix A). However, it is necessary to put these amounts in perspective: transfers
from the government sector of 10% of the total balance sheet of nonfinancial corporations
in the euro area total more than EUR 4.3 trillion.19 As signaled in Section III.D, loan moratoria
do not imply a transfer of resources from the government sector to nonfinancial
corporations but indicate a suspension of interest payments. In this case, thus, 𝐼𝐿𝑖 is equal to
zero. Given that our analysis also covers 2021 and as most loan moratoria in the euro area
were set to expire throughout 2021 (affecting mostly households), we do not take loan
moratoria into account in these estimates. In the case of loan guarantees, they could
indirectly do so, as the transfer occurs with the intermediation of the banking sector. A more
realistic scenario, based on ESRB (2021a) findings and considering the transfers made
during 2019 (about 1% of total assets, according to Appendix A), could then consider
According to Appendix A, the total balance sheet of euro area nonfinancial corporations amounted to EUR
43.7 trillion at the end of 2019.
19
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government support on the order of 2% of the size of the balance sheet, leading to an
increase in NPLs of 7.07% (EUR 797 billion, according to data from Appendix A).20
Figure 11 can be interpreted as showing an almost unavoidably large increase in NPLs as a
result of the COVID-19 pandemic. To bring that increase close to zero, the effort of the
government sector should be enormous, with transfers above EUR 5 trillion. The total size
of the balance sheet of the government sector in the euro area was EUR 11.5 trillion at the
end of 2019, as shown by Appendix A.
Another alternative for nonfinancial corporations is to sell some of their assets, to generate
additional inflows and compensate the drop of sales caused by the pandemic. This strategy
entails a destruction of capital and, when sales occur simultaneously, can lead to fire sales
and lower proceeds from these operations. Besides, the sales should be massive to have a
real impact on the additional NPLs.
As outlined in Section III.D, one of the key conditions for government support to mitigate the
impact of the pandemic refers to its effectiveness. One way of addressing government
programs’ effectiveness in practice is by providing more support to the most impacted
sectors.
Indeed, our previous calculations implicitly assume a lineal distribution of government
transfers across sectors regardless of how much they are impacted by the pandemic. But
they are differently impacted: some sectors, such as accommodation and food service
activities, are heavily impacted while others, such as information and communication
services, do not feel a large impact from the COVID-19 pandemic.
In Section IV.B, we identified sectors I (accommodation and food service activities), N
(administrative and support service activities), R (Arts, entertainment, and recreation), and
S (other services activities) as those mostly affected by the pandemic, while sectors D
(electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply), E (water supply, sewerage, and waste
management and remediation activities), J (information and communication services) and
M (professional, scientific, and technical activities) were almost not affected. As an
illustration of what can be achieved with a targeted used of government transfers, we can
assume that transfers of the government are fixed at 2% of the total balance sheet of
nonfinancial corporations (EUR 874 billion) and that the transfers are initially allocated to
sectors with the lowest impact are distributed first to sector I (accommodation and food
service activities) until it reaches 15% of the total balance sheet, and then to sectors N
(administrative and support service activities), R (arts, entertainment, and recreation), and
S (other services activities), as shown by Figure 12. So, government support effectively goes
to the most affected sectors.

If we consider also the EUR 1.85 trillion of the European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (PEPP), the total size of government support exceeds 6% of total assets of nonfinancial
corporations. We do not include the PEPP in our calculations as it is an indirect source of support.
20
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Figure 12: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Examples of Targeted Government
Transfers to Most Affected Sectors
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Impact of COVID-19 pandemic (severe scenario)

Notes: The blue bars show government transfers of 2% of total assets for all sectors while the orange bars show
an example of targeted government transfers to the most affected sectors, according to the severe scenario
defined in Section IV.B. The impact of the pandemic under this scenario is shown by the grey dots, with
reference to the right axis, with inverted values. A stands for agriculture, forestry, and fishing; B for mining and
quarrying; C for manufacturing; D for electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E for water supply,
sewerage, and waste management and remediation activities; F for construction; G for wholesale and retail
trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; H for transporting and storage; I for accommodation and
food service activities; J for information and communication services; L for real estate activities; M for
professional, scientific, and technical activities; N for administrative and support service activities; R for arts,
entertainment, and recreation; and S for other services activities.
Source: Author’s analysis.

As shown by Figure 13, doing so brings the additional rate of NPLs to the same level as that
associated with transfers from the government equal to 4% of the total balance sheet of
nonfinancial corporations. The difference implies having additional NPLs for EUR 797 billion
or for EUR 736 billion.
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Figure 13: Increase in the Rate of NPLs to Euro Area Nonfinancial Corporations from
the COVID-19 Pandemic
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Notes: The blue bars show the increase, in percentage points, in the rate of NPLs that would be triggered by the
COVID-19 pandemic under different combinations of transfers from the government and assuming no disposal
of assets. The orange bar shows the increase in the rate of NPLs in case government transfers are targeted to
the sectors most affected by the pandemic. Data refers to the euro area. Sector J (information and
communication services) is excluded as it shows a positive impact from the pandemic, which would result in a
reduction of NPLs.
Source: Author’s analysis.

E.

Estimating the Increase of Nonperforming Loans from Households in the Euro
Area

To compute the expected increase in NPLs from households, we use data from the 2017 wave
of the ECB Household Finance and Consumption Survey (Household Finance and
Consumption Network 2020), which covers the euro area and divides households according
to the percentiles 20, 40, 60 80, and 90 of their income and net worth. To keep all percentiles
of the same size, we exclude the 90 percentile and assume that households above it are equal
to households between the 80 and 90 percentiles. The reference date for this data is 2017,
but these variables are not subject to sudden and large movements in the short term.
While not being very granular, the ECB Household Finance and Consumption Survey allows
a direct mapping to the variables in Equation (10), as shown in Figure 14. We consider the
distribution of households according to their net wealth.
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Figure 14: Values Attributed to Main Variables in the Estimation of NPLs Arising from
the COVID-19 Pandemic in Relation to Loans to Households
Variable

Value

Comments

̂𝐻
𝐼𝑃

0.3168

As estimated in Section IV.C

𝐼𝐹𝑗

Varies
across
percentiles

Calculated as the difference between median gross
household income, as reported in Table 10 of Household
Finance and Consumption Network (2020), and wages,
calculated as above

𝑊𝑗

Varies
across
percentiles

From Appendix A, we compute the share of wages over
total inflows and apply that share to the median gross
household income, as reported in Table 10 of Household
Finance and Consumption Network (2020)

𝐶𝑂 𝑗

Varies
across
percentiles

Median expenditures on food and on utilities, Table 11 of
Household Finance and Consumption Network (2020)

Varies
across
percentiles

Comprising taxes, as reported in Appendix A, and
attributed linearly across our five group of households

0.5

To account for intermediate consumption and
consumption by the public sector

0.2074

As estimated in Section IV.B for the severe scenario

Varies
across
percentiles

Total amount taken from Appendix A and distributed
exponentially starting with households with lowest net
wealth

—

At this stage, not considered

Varies
across
percentiles

Conditional mean of total debt, Table 7 of Household
Finance and Consumption Network (2020)

0.025

Based on the ECB MIR database (0.0255 as of end 2019)

𝑂𝑂𝐹

𝑗

𝛽
𝑁𝐹𝐶
̂
𝐼𝑃

𝑇𝑅

𝑗

𝑆𝐴𝑗
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗
𝑟𝑗

Sources: ECB 2021b; Household Finance and Consumption Network 2020; author’s analysis.

Considering that no additional transfers from governments are made and that households
are not in need of selling some assets to maintain their financial position, the direct impact
of the pandemic should not lead households to massively default on their loans (Figure 15).
Across different groups of households depending on their net wealth, they have a wide buffer
to absorb the related losses. An important factor to take into account are the social benefits
in place in many European countries (for example, unemployment benefits), which partially
shield household income from adverse shocks and mostly benefit households with lower net
wealth.
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Figure 15: Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Households According to Their Net
Wealth
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Notes: The orange line represents the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on euro area households, as calculated
in Section IV.C. The blue bars represent the values taken by the right-side of Equation (10). If blue bars were
below the orange line, households could be seen at high risk of nonpayment of their loans. Households are
sorted into five groups, depending on their levels of net wealth.
Source: Author’s analysis.

While the direct impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the potential wave of NPLs it
generates can be expected to arise in the sector of nonfinancial corporations, households
should not witness a widespread increase in NPLs. With the granularity provided by the ECB
Household Finance and Consumption Survey, we do not find evidence suggesting a massive
deterioration in the financial soundness of households across the euro area.
Nonetheless, three important points are worth noting:
The fact that the aggregated sector seems resilient to the COVID-19 pandemic does not
exclude the possibility that the most vulnerable households can experience severe stress.
According to Eurostat (2022d), there are approximately 195 million households in the
EU, so 5% of them suffering severe financial stress would mean that almost 10 million
households are under severe stress.
Government support comes as a cost to governments, which are going to see their
indebtedness increase substantially. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
government debt sustainability is not under the scope of this paper, but it may be
particularly large if economic recovery is not strong enough to allow for a
discontinuation of the support measures in the medium term.
Second-round effects derived from additional stress in nonfinancial corporations over
2021 are not considered. For example, if reduced sales of nonfinancial corporations as a
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result of the COVID-19 pandemic start having widespread consequences for their
solvency, households working in the most affected nonfinancial corporations could lose
their jobs and their main source of income.
F.

Second-Round Effects from Corporate Insolvencies

We concluded in the previous section that the COVID-19 pandemic should not directly create
a wave of NPLs in the household sector. However, households can be affected by massive
corporate insolvencies triggered by the pandemic, as many of them would lose their main
source of income within a short time. In this section, we look at the potential for massive
corporate insolvencies and how that may affect NPLs in the household sector. Our main
assumption in this section is that the additional nonfinancial corporations with negative
equity file for insolvency and then fire their employees, who would lose their main source of
income and, in turn, could default on their loan payments.
Using data from Eurostat on the number of employees in the euro area per NACE sector
(Eurostat 2022a), we see that the sectors of nonfinancial corporations with the highest
number of employees (manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade) would in principle not
be much affected by the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 16). The most affected sector
(accommodation and food service activities) employs a relatively small proportion of
workers in the EU, slightly above 5% of the total.
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Figure 16: Total Employment per Sector (left side) and Impact of the COVID-19
Pandemic (right side)
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Notes: The blue bars represent the percentage of employees in the euro area in each sector of nonfinancial
corporations while the orange dots represent the impact of the pandemic (with values in reversed order)
between March and December 2020, computed in Section IV.B. A stands for agriculture, forestry, and fishing;
B for mining and quarrying; C for manufacturing; D for electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E for
water supply, sewerage, and waste management and remediation activities; F for construction; G for wholesale
and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; H for transporting and storage; I for
accommodation and food service activities; J for information and communication services; L for real estate
activities; M for professional, scientific, and technical activities; N for administrative and support service
activities; R for arts, entertainment, and recreation; and S for other services activities.
Sources: Eurostat 2022a; author’s analysis.

A nonfinancial corporation is under severe risk of insolvency when its accumulated net
worth and the shares and other equity are negative (in other words, when the value of all the
liabilities exceed the value of its assets). In the context of the shock the COVID-19 pandemic
caused, that would imply that the inflows and outflows of 2020 should exceed their
accumulated net worth and equity at the end of 2019:
̂s )) + TRi + IF i − OF i − ILi + SFAi )
NW i + EQi < (S i x (1 − IP

(19)

̂𝑠 to
where NW refers to accumulated net worth, EQ to shares and other equity, S to sales, 𝐼𝑃
the impact of the pandemic on the sector of activity s, TR to transfers from the government,
IF to inflows, OF to outflows, IL to the interest paid on loans, and SFA to inflows from the sale
of fixed assets.
We regroup the terms in Equation (19) and get an expression as follows:
𝑁𝑊 𝑖 +𝐸𝑄𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑆
−𝐼𝐿
𝑆𝐹𝐴
̂𝑠 )) + 𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝑆 +𝐼𝐹 −𝑂𝐹
< (𝑇𝐴𝑖 𝑥 (−𝐼𝑃
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑖
𝑇𝐴
𝑇𝐴𝑖
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where, in addition to the variables defined in Equation (19), TA refers to total assets. We can
interpret 𝑆 𝑖 + 𝐼𝐹 𝑖 − 𝑂𝐹 𝑖 − 𝐼𝐿𝑖 as the profit of the period for the nonfinancial corporation i.
𝑁𝑊 𝑖 +𝐸𝑄 𝑖

Looking at the BACH database of the ECCBSO, we consider that the term 𝑇𝐴𝑖 is equivalent
to the inverse of the assets-to-equity ratio. We assume that the inverse of the assets-to-equity
ratio follows a normal distribution, computing the variance from the interquartile range.
𝑁𝑊+𝐸𝑄
𝑇𝐴

𝑄3−𝑄1 2

≈ 𝑁(𝑄2, (

1.35

(21)

) )

From here, we compute the number of nonfinancial corporations in each sector operating
with negative equity before the start of the pandemic. These are the blue bars in Figure 17,
with values fluctuating between 5% (mining and quarrying) and 15% (electricity, gas, steam,
and air conditioning supply; and real estate activities). The blue bars in Figure 17 can be seen
as the proportion of “zombie” corporations in each sector prior to the pandemic.
𝑖

𝑆
̂𝑠 ), with the first term equal to
If we apply the shock caused by the pandemic (𝑇𝐴𝑖 𝑥 (−𝐼𝑃
0.1096 and the second term taken from our estimation in Section IV.B) and absent transfers
from the government and sales of assets, the number of nonfinancial corporations operating
with negative equity increases, as shown by the orange bars in Figure 17. Overall, the average
increase is about 1.4% (affecting about 1% of the total employees in the euro area), albeit
with large heterogeneity across sectors. The larger increase is found in the accommodation
and food service activities sector, which has been subject to the largest shock from the
COVID-19 pandemic and where nonfinancial corporations with negative equity increase
from 10.56% to 16.60%. Several sectors (transporting and storage; administrative and
support service activities; arts, entertainment, and recreation; and other services activities)
see growth of the share of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity above 20% as well.
At the other extreme, the water supply, sewerage, and waste management and remediation
activities sector and information and communication services do not see any increase in the
proportion of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity as a result of the pandemic,
while others have minor increases.
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Figure 17: Share of Nonfinancial Corporations with Negative Equity
18%

60%

16%
50%

14%
12%

40%

10%

Change in the share of
nonfinancial corporations with
negative equity due to COVID19 pandemic

Share of nonfinancial
corporations with negative equity
(2018)

30%
8%
6%

20%

4%
10%
2%
0%

Cross-sectoral average of
nonfinancial corporations with
negative equity (2018)
Growth rate of nonfinancial
corporations with negative equity
due to COVID-19 pandemic

0%
A B C D E

F G H

I

J

L M N R

S

Notes: The blue bars represent the share of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity as of 2018,
according to Equation (21) and using data from the BACH database. The orange bars represent the change in
that number derived from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The blue dots, in the right axis scale, represent
the growth in the number of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity before and after the pandemic. A
stands for agriculture, forestry, and fishing; B for mining and quarrying; C for manufacturing; D for electricity,
gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E for water supply, sewerage, and waste management and remediation
activities; F for construction; G for wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; H
for transporting and storage; I for accommodation and food service activities; J for information and
communication services; L for real estate activities; M for professional, scientific, and technical activities; N for
administrative and support service activities; R for arts, entertainment, and recreation; and S for other services
activities.
Sources: BACH Working Group 2015; author’s analysis.

So far, we have not considered any form of government support to nonfinancial corporations.
As in Section IV.D, we make different assumptions about the size of government support in
terms of total assets of nonfinancial corporations. Besides, we have seen that about 10% of
nonfinancial corporations entered the COVID-19 pandemic with negative equity, signaling a
worrying solvency position. We can make several assumptions about the share of these that
would become insolvent as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
We can express the amount of NPLs to arise from the second-round effects of corporate
insolvencies as follows:
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐻 = ∑𝑆𝑠=1 𝜃 𝑠 𝑥 (𝛼 𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [

𝑁𝑊 𝑖 +𝐸𝑄 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

< 0] + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 [

𝑁𝑊 𝑖 +𝐸𝑄 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

𝑆𝑖

𝑇𝑅 𝑖

̂𝑠 ) − 𝑖 ]) (22)
< (𝑇𝐴𝑖 𝑥 𝐼𝑃
𝑇𝐴

where 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝐻 is the impact of the pandemic on households, 𝜃 𝑠 is the share of employment in
sector s over total employment, 𝛼 the proportion of nonfinancial corporations with negative
equity prior to the COVID-19 pandemic that become insolvent as a result of the pandemic,
𝑁𝑊 𝑖 +𝐸𝑄𝑖
𝑆𝑖
̂𝑠
a
proxy
for
the
leverage
ratio
(net
worth
and
equity
divided
by
total
assets),
𝑖
𝑖 𝑥 𝐼𝑃
𝑇𝐴

𝑇𝐴
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the impact of the pandemic on nonfinancial corporations, and
government as a share of total assets.

𝑇𝑅 𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝑖

the transfers from the

NPLs may thus arise from the proportion of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic that file for corporate insolvency as a result of the pandemic
and from nonfinancial corporations that were having positive equity at the onset of the
pandemic but were severely affected by it, in a way that the government support via
transfers cannot fully compensate. We assume that households employed in the nonfinancial
corporations filing for insolvency default on their loan payments. We lack granular data to
make a more fine-tuned assumption, and therefore, our results can be seen as a worst-case
rather than a baseline scenario.
Figure 18 shows the increase in the rate of NPLs to households as a result of corporate
insolvencies under different assumptions regarding the extent of government support (xaxis) and the degree to which the COVID-19 pandemic triggers the insolvency of nonfinancial
corporations with negative equity prior to the pandemic (chart legend). In the extreme
situation without government support and with all the nonfinancial corporations with
negative equity going to insolvency, the rate of NPLs in the household sector can increase
above 7%. This is, however, an unlikely outcome, given the extent of government support. If
we consider that the transfers from the government to nonfinancial corporations account for
2% of their total assets and that the pandemic can trigger the insolvency of 25% of
nonfinancial corporations with negative equity before the onset of the pandemic, the rate of
additional NPLs reaches 2.1% (EUR 145 billion, as based on the amounts in Appendix A).
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Figure 18: NPLs in the Household Sector Derived from Corporate Insolvencies
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Notes: The y-axis shows the share of NPLs of households that may arise as a result of corporate insolvencies,
under different assumptions regarding the transfers from the government (x-axis) and the degree to which
nonfinancial corporations with negative equity before the onset of the pandemic would become nonperforming
as a result of the pandemic (see legend).
Source: Author’s analysis.

In the above calculations, we consider that transfers from the government are equally
distributed across sectors of nonfinancial corporations. As a result, those sectors most
affected by the pandemic are treated the same as other sectors less severely affected.
Extending government support without considering the impact of the pandemic can have the
unintended consequence of helping nonfinancial corporations in a vulnerable situation
before the pandemic (with negative equity) and that should probably exit the market to
continue their operations throughout the pandemic.
This is more clearly seen if we assume that the pandemic does not trigger the insolvency of
any nonfinancial corporations that entered it with negative equity (value of 0 for the legend
in Figure 18). Figure 19 shows the increase, in percentage points, of the share of nonfinancial
corporations with negative equity across different sectors and under different scenarios of
government support. What emerges from these potential outcomes is a significant increase
for sector I (accommodation and food service activities), which is not replicated by any other
sector. Extending government support equally across sectors leads to reducing the number
of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity in the other sectors and only slowly
decreases the increase for sector I (accommodation and food service activities). This does
not seem the most optimal way of addressing difficulties in nonfinancial corporations.
Targeted interventions by the government across sectors, depending on the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, seem to be justified.
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Figure 19: Change in the Share of Nonfinancial Corporations with Negative Equity
under Different Assumptions of Transfers from Governments
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Notes: Each bar shows the difference in the share of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity before the
COVID-19 pandemic and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, considering that transfers from
government vary between 0 and 5% of the total balance sheet of nonfinancial corporations and that no
nonfinancial corporation with negative equity at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic becomes insolvent.
Positive (negative) values indicate that the share of nonfinancial corporations with negative equity is higher
(lower) than at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. A stands for agriculture, forestry, and fishing; B for mining
and quarrying; C for manufacturing; D for electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E for water supply,
sewerage, and waste management and remediation activities; F for construction; G for wholesale and retail
trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; H for transporting and storage; I for accommodation and
food service activities; J for information and communication services; L for real estate activities; M for
professional, scientific, and technical activities; N for administrative and support service activities; R for arts,
entertainment, and recreation; and S for other services activities.
Source: Author’s analysis.

If we assume the same targeted intervention as in Section IV.D, whereby government
support does not reach all sectors equally but is directed toward the most affected
nonfinancial sectors, the increase in the share of NPLs to households resulting from
corporate insolvencies is 0.65% (EUR 45 billion according to the data in Appendix A). Again,
simply by using more efficiently the transfers from the governments, the amount of
additional NPLs decreases by EUR 100 billion in the euro area.

V. NPLs and the Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Banks
Before measuring the loss-absorbing capacity of banks on the basis of their accumulated
equity and their leverage ratio, we make some considerations in the next section about bank
resilience and the importance of maintaining a sound banking system through recessions.
Afterwards, we propose some metrics to analyze the capacity of the banking system to
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absorb losses derived from NPLs and apply these metrics to the estimate of NPLs computed
in the previous section and to other previous crises. We use the estimates in Figure 20 for
NPLs, derived in Section IV.D and Section IV.F.
Figure 20: Values Attributed to Main Variables in the Estimation of NPLs Arising from
the COVID-19 Pandemic in Relation to Loans to Households
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A. Discussion of Bank Resilience in Times of COVID-19
In general terms, stress on nonfinancial corporations and households usually leads to an
increase in NPLs. The academic literature has found that the evolution of the real economy
plays a fundamental role in the evolution of NPLs (Beck, Jakubik, and Piloiu 2015; Ghosh
2015). When considering the timing for the recognition of NPLs, it is important to note that
the definition of NPLs entails nonpayment over 90 days. As such, the recognition of new NPLs
tends to occur with some delay in comparison to the start of an economic recession.21
Therefore, the impact of the stress in the real economy on the balance sheet of banks can
then be expected to occur gradually.22

The definition of NPLs also introduces the criterion of the borrower being unlikely to pay, in parallel to the
90-days past-due criterion. As a result, earlier recognition of NPLs could be possible if the unlikely to pay
criterion is used. Since 2015, the recognition of NPLs under the unlikely to pay criterion has varied between
30% and 40% of total NPLs (EBA 2019).
22 Over the long term, for banks using internal ratings models for the computation of capital requirements for
credit risk, the increase in credit risk may be reflected in the main parameters used in these models
(probabilities of default, loss given default, and exposures at default), leading to an increase in risk weights
associated with credit exposures, even if they are not recognized as nonperforming (or defaulted).
21
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The increase in provisions resulting from the recognition of additional NPLs related to the
COVID-19 pandemic is expected to reduce profits (or increase losses) and equity. When
banks are simultaneously subject to that reduction and amidst a challenging and uncertain
macroeconomic environment,23 the optimal individual response of banks may be to restrict
new lending and deleverage to avoid the need to raise new capital or to reduce dividends.
This response is, however, not optimal for the banking sector as a whole. Such behavioral
response of banks is empirically documented in the academic literature (Berger and Udell
1994; Bernanke and Lown 1991; Gropp et al. 2018). Even if banks may have taken measures
in the form of voluntarily reducing buffers, an overall reduction in new lending can be
expected over the medium term, in the absence of policy actions by regulatory and
supervisory authorities.
In a comparison with the GFC, the solvency position of banks at the end of 2019 was better
than in 2007, with higher liquidity and capital ratios (the latter, both in absolute and in riskweighted terms). Besides, prudential authorities have tools available to address the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic on existing and on new lending. The current regulatory
requirements establish that internal ratings models should use parameters through the cycle
(TTC) rather than only as a point in time (PIT). Consequently, the impact of sudden
recessions on prudential requirements can be attenuated. Other actions taken by prudential
authorities refer to the release of previously built countercyclical capital buffers, guidance to
make sure that regulatory provisions (especially cyclical capital buffers) do not impede the
provision of credit to the real economy, and the retention of profits. In the accounting
domain, the expected credit loss approach in International Financial Reporting Standard
(IFRS) 9, put in place after the GFC, requires banks to anticipate provisioning of those credit
exposures with a significant deterioration in credit risk (these exposures are moved into
Stage 2, requiring the recognition of provisions for the whole lifetime of the exposure),
without the need to wait for the recognition of the exposure as nonperforming (ESRB 2017;
ESRB 2019).
B. Estimating the Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Banks
In view of the potential amount of NPLs to be generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, we
analyze the capacity of banking systems subject to a non-risk-weighted capital requirement
(that is, the leverage ratio) to absorb the losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
We consider that banks are subject to two binding prudential requirements (leverage ratio
or risk-weighted capital ratios). We define these two requirements as:
𝐿𝑅𝑡 =

𝑂𝐹𝑡

(23)

𝑇𝐴𝑡

Banks have been operating with low levels of profitability, also derived from legacy assets from the GFC and
from the macroeconomic environment of low growth and low interest rates.
23
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𝑂𝐹𝑡

𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑡 = 𝑅𝑊𝐷
𝑡

𝑡

(24)

𝑥 𝑇𝐴𝑡

where LRt denotes the leverage ratio, OFt own funds, TAt total assets, RWAt risk-weighted
assets, and RWDt risk-weight densities (defined as risk-weighted assets divided by total
assets).
If we operate further and assume a prudential requirement of 3% for the leverage ratio
̅̅̅̅ = 0.03) and of 8% for the risk-weighted capital requirement (𝐶𝑅
̅̅̅̅ = 0.08), we obtain:
(𝐿𝑅
𝑂𝐹𝑡 = 𝐿𝑅𝑡 𝑥 𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝐶𝑅𝑡 𝑥 𝑅𝑊𝐷𝑡 𝑥 𝑇𝐴𝑡
0.08 𝑥 𝑅𝑊𝐷𝑡 = 0.03
0.03

(25)

𝑅𝑊𝐷𝑡 = 0.08 = 0.375

Therefore, for banks with relatively low risk-weight densities (below 37.5%), the leverage
ratio is the binding prudential requirement (see also Bank of England 2014). Given the low
risk-weight densities shown by banks in the last years (Basten and Sánchez Serrano 2019),
we can assume that the risk-weighted capital requirement is sometimes not binding on
banks.
Losses are absorbed by the existing capital of the banks, and the leverage ratio measures the
loss-absorbing capacity of the banking system. That loss-absorbing capacity can be thought
to be the amount of own funds of the bank in excess of the prudential requirement of the
leverage ratio. We refer to this as excess of own funds.
We express the excess of own funds in absolute terms as follows:
𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑡 =

̅̅̅̅ 𝑥 𝑇𝐴𝑡 𝑥 (1−𝜃))
𝑂𝐹𝑡 −(𝐿𝑅
̅̅̅̅ )
(1−𝐿𝑅

(26)

where EOFt refers to the excess of own funds, ̅̅̅̅
𝐿𝑅 to the binding prudential requirement for
the leverage ratio (that is, 3%), TA to total assets, and 𝜃 to the reduction in balance sheet size
̅̅̅̅) is included to consider that a loss reduces the
through deleverage. The expression (1 − 𝐿𝑅
total balance sheet of the bank as well, so the own funds required to meet the binding
leverage ratio need to be slightly adjusted.
Equation (26) can also be expressed as a share of total assets:
𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑡 =

̅̅̅̅ 𝑥 𝑇𝐴𝑡 𝑥 (1−𝜃))
𝑂𝐹𝑡 −(𝐿𝑅
̅̅̅̅ )
𝑇𝐴𝑡 𝑥 (1−𝐿𝑅

(27)

where, in addition to the variables defined for Equation (26), eoft refers to the excess of own
funds as a share of total assets.
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Equation (26) and Equation (27) show a positive contribution of deleverage on the lossabsorption capacity of banks. From the point of the view of an individual bank, deleverage is
an available valid strategy in a crisis, as it immediately increases the bank’s capacity to
absorb losses.
In the next step, we compute how much NPLs should increase to fully exhaust the excess of
own funds and breach the binding prudential requirement for the leverage ratio. The
increase of NPLs that would bring the leverage ratio of banks to 3% is equal to:
∆𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑡 =

(𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑡 𝑥 (1+𝛾))+(𝛼 𝑥 𝑇𝐿𝑡 𝑥 (1−𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑡 ))
(𝑇𝐿𝑡 𝑥 (1−𝜃𝐿 ))−(𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑡 𝑥 (1+𝛾))

(28)

where nplt is the rate of NPLs (calculated as the ratio of NPLs to total loans), EOF is the excess
of own funds, 𝛾 is the recovery value from NPLs (or the amount of credit losses to be
absorbed), 𝛼 is the provisioning of performing loans (Stage 1 and Stage 2 loans under IFRS
9), TL refers to total loans, and 𝜃𝐿 is the reduction in total loans. On the latter, the reduction
in total loans does not necessarily imply a reduction in total assets, as banks may opt for
intensifying other activities and business lines. As in the previous equation, the expression
(𝐸𝑂𝐹𝑡 𝑥 (1 + 𝛾)) is deducted from total loans in the denominator as the absorption of these
losses reduces the total amount of loans.
According to Equation (28), the necessary increase of the rate of NPLs to exhaust the excess
of own funds is a positive function of the existing provisioning for performing exposures, of
the expected recovered amounts from NPLs, and of the existing excess of own funds. These
are three important channels through which the resilience of the banking sector can be
strengthened, particularly before the shock hits the economy.
C.

Increasing the Capacity to Withstand Losses from NPLs

Equation (28) reveals three important factors that shape the resilience of banks against an
increase in NPLs and that have been the focus of intense policy work in the aftermath of the
GFC:
(1)

Provisioning before the loan becomes nonperforming (𝛼). Under incurred loss
approaches in accounting, a bank would not be allowed to recognise any loss from
loans for which a default event has not occurred. With the introduction of expected
credit loss approaches after the GFC, some credit losses can be recognized from
their inception (ESRB 2017; ESRB 2019; Sánchez Serrano 2018). So, the capacity of
the bank to anticipate downturns and to provision in advance can positively
contribute to increasing its resilience once the shock materializes.

(2)

The amount recovered from NPLs (𝛾). There are several factors that can influence
how much a bank can recover from a loan that becomes nonperforming. Starting
with the most obvious, collateralized lending allows banks to recover higher
amounts than unsecured lending. But factors like efficiency in courts and the
existence of developed secondary markets for NPLs can also contribute to increase
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the values recovered from them (Baudino and Yun 2017).
(3)

The reduction in total loans (𝜃𝐿 ). Indeed, an automatic way to gain resilience for a
bank is to reduce the size of the loan portfolio so that existing equity covers a
smaller loan portfolio. As mentioned before, this solution can be optimal for an
individual bank, but when considered at the aggregate can generate a credit crunch
and intensify the effects of the downturn.

In the following paragraphs, we illustrate the importance of the three variables above by
means of a hypothetical example. Let’s assume a loan portfolio of 100 currency units (CU),
where 2 CU are nonperforming at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and where the bank
has an excess of own funds of 5 CU. We assume that banks can recover 30% of the amount of
NPLs, and that accumulated provisions for performing loans represent 0.4% of them. 24
Figure 21 shows in the y-axis the evolution of the change in the rate of NPLs that exhausts
the excess of own funds of the bank for different values of the accumulated provisions for
performing loans, of the recovered amounts from NPLs, and of the reduction in total loans,
separately (shown in the x-axis).
Starting with the left panel on accumulated provisions for performing loans, our initial
conditions (green diamond in the left-side chart of Figure 21) lead to a rate of NPLs to
exhaust accumulated equity close to 7.4%. To increase that rate of NPLs by 1 percentage
point to 8.4% requires that provisions increase more than threefold (from 0.4% to 1.3%), as
shown by the orange diamond. In the case of recovered amounts, recovering 30% of NPLs
makes the bank resilient until a rate of NPLs reaches slightly above 7.3% (green diamond in
the middle chart of Figure 21). As in the previous case, if we want the rate of NPLs that
exhaust own funds to increase by 1 percentage point, the recovered amounts from NPLs
should be around 0.5. In other words, banks should recover approximately 50% from the
value of NPLs (orange diamond in the middle chart of Figure 21). Finally, in the case of
reductions in total loans, banks need to reduce their total loans by about 12% to increase the
rate of NPLs that exhaust their own funds (orange diamond in the right chart of Figure 21).

The latter being in line with the values reported in the EBA Risk Dashboard for pre-pandemic periods (EBA
2020b).
24
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Figure 21: Impact of Provisioning, Recovered Amounts from NPLs, and Deleveraging
on the Rate of NPLs That Exhaust the Excess of Own Funds of Banks
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Notes: The chart on the left shows the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of own funds of banks with different
intensities in provisioning (as a percentage of total loans). The chart in the middle shows the rate of NPLs that
exhaust the excess of own funds of banks with different recovered amounts from NPLs (as a percentage of the
gross carrying amount of the loan). The chart on the right shows the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of
own funds of banks with different values of the amount of total loans on the balance sheet of the bank (as a
percentage change over the outstanding amount in the previous period). Green diamonds represent the initial
situation, mirroring the status of the European banking system at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the
orange diamonds represent the value of each variable that increases the rate of NPLs that exhaust own funds
by 1 percentage point.
Source: Author’s analysis.

Although the three parameters increase the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of own
funds, their effect presents interesting differences. Indeed, changes in the recovered
amounts from NPLs have the largest effect on the resilience of the bank. Besides, the curve
for changes in total loans seems to be slightly convex. There is an additional point to consider
here. As changes in accumulated provisions and in the recovered amounts from NPLs take
time to materialize and are most likely not adopted in times of crisis, changes in total loans
may be the only existing alternative for banks to increase their resilience during a crisis. But
this strategy seems to be the least effective in overall terms. That dynamic points to the
importance of “repairing the roof during sunny days.”
D. Testing the Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Banks in Several Scenarios
In this section, we compute the excess own funds and the increase in NPLs that would lead
banks to breach the leverage ratio requirement under several hypothetical scenarios. We
start from Equation (26) and Equation (28) and use the values shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Values for the Main Variables and Parameters to Assess the LossAbsorbing Capacity of Banks in the Euro Area
Parameter

OFt
̅̅̅̅
𝑳𝑹
TAt
TLt
𝜸

Value

Source and other information

1,798

ECB Consolidated Banking Data, euro area, end 2019, bn EUR,
total equity, domestic and stand-alone banks

0.03

According to Basel III as implemented in the EU

24,926

ECB Consolidated Banking Data, euro area, end 2019, bn EUR,
domestic and stand-alone banks

16,386

ECB Consolidated Banking Data, euro area, end 2019, bn EUR,
domestic and stand-alone banks

0.35

Taken from Chart 10 of ESRB (2021b)

0.0043

EBA Risk Dashboard, end 2019, computed as the share of
loans in stages 1 and 2 multiplied by their coverage, divided
by total loans

0.027

EBA Risk Dashboard

𝜶
nplt

Sources: EBA 2020b; ECB 2021a; ESRB 2021b; author’s analysis.

With this specification, the increase in the rate of NPLs to exhaust the excess of own funds
should be slightly above 10% in case the bank does not decrease its amount of total assets
and total loans (equivalent to 0 in the x-axis of Figure 21). As shown in Section V.B,
deleverage, both in terms of total loans and total assets, slightly increases the loss-absorption
capacity of banks.
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Figure 23: Rate of NPLs That Exhaust the Excess of Own Funds of Banks under
Different Assumptions Regarding Total Assets and Total Loans
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Notes: The x-axis shows the reduction in total loans in the balance sheet of banks and the y-axis NPL rates. The
blue line shows the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of own funds over the 3% leverage ratio requirement
of banks, considering that banks reduce their balance sheets and their lending at the same rate. The orange line
shows the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of own funds over the 3% leverage ratio requirement of banks,
considering that banks reduce their lending but maintain their total balance sheet size constant. All calculations
made according to the values in Figure 22 and Equation (28).
Source: Author’s analysis.

The implicit ratio between total equity and total assets in our calculations is about 7.2%.
However, as shown by Figure 24, there is large heterogeneity in the leverage ratio across the
euro area. While some banking systems exhibit values of the leverage ratio close to 10%,
leverage ratios of banks in other countries take values around or below 6%. In the latter
group, we find the largest national banking systems: Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands.
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Figure 24: Leverage Ratio in Euro Area Banking Systems
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Notes: Data refers to the fully phased-in leverage ratio as reported in the EBA Risk Dashboard (EBA 2020b),
with reference date December 2020.
Source: EBA 2020b.

In Figure 25, we show the rate of new NPLs that exhaust the excess of own funds, with a
leverage ratio of 5.5%. In this case, the loss-absorption capacity of the banking system is
significantly lower than in Figure 23, as an increase of 6% in the rate of NPLs is enough to
exhaust the excess of own funds in banks.
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Figure 25: Rate of NPLs That Exhaust the Excess of Own Funds of Banks under
Different Assumptions Regarding Total Assets and Total Loans, Assuming a Leverage
Ratio of 5.5%
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Notes: The x-axis shows the reduction in total loans in the balance sheet of banks and the y-axis NPL rates. The
blue line shows the rate of NPLs that exhausts the excess of own funds over the 3% leverage ratio requirement,
considering that banks reduce their balance sheets and their lending at the same rate. The orange line shows
the rate of NPLs that exhausts the excess of own funds over the 3% leverage ratio requirement, considering
that banks reduce their lending but maintain their total balance sheet size constant. All calculations made
according to Equation (28) and the values in Figure 22, except for total assets and own funds, the latter being
fixed as 5.5% of total assets.
Source: Author’s analysis.

We look now at the possible increase in NPLs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Together
with our estimates from Section IV (5.18% and 4.30%), we use the increase in the adverse
scenario of the 2018 EBA stress test (EBA 2018), the estimate in Gourinchas et al. (2020),
the average increase in NPLs in the GFC in the euro area countries, and the increase in NPLs
in the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. The two latter are taken from the database of Laeven
and Valencia (2020).
The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 26. We appreciate first that an increase
of NPLs as reported in Figure 20 could be absorbed by the euro area banking system, and the
same applies when considering the results of the 2018 EBA stress test exercise (purple
dotted line). However, the line for nontargeted government measures gets rather close to
the dark blue line associated with a leverage ratio of 5.5%. So, for those jurisdictions with
lower values of the leverage ratio and nontargeted government support measures, the
expected increase in NPLs can threaten the solvency of the banking system as a whole,
particularly if banks do not deleverage. Similarly, in the case of the estimate in Gourinchas et
al. (2020), which does not consider government support, absorbing the derived losses can
be problematic for those jurisdictions with lower leverage ratios. An increase in NPLs such
as the one seen in the GFC in the euro area countries (green dotted line) can be absorbed
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only by jurisdictions with higher leverage ratios and only with substantial deleveraging.
Otherwise, the related losses exceed the accumulated own funds of banks. Finally, a scenario
replicating the Asian crisis in terms of NPLs results in an insufficient capacity of the euro
area banking system to absorb losses. This scenario seems nowadays far from the baseline
expectations.
Figure 26: Increases in the Rates of NPLs That Exhaust the Excess of Own Funds and
Selected Rates of NPLs
30%

Reduction in total loans and total
assets - leverage ratio 5.5%

25%

Reduction in total loans and total
assets - leverage ratio 7.2%
Increase NPLs - Asian crisis

20%

Increase NPLs - Global Financial
Crisis
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Increase NPLs - Gourinchas et al.
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Increase NPLs - EBA stress test
2018
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Increase NPLs - nontargeted
government transfers
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government transfers

Notes: The x-axis shows the reduction in total loans in the balance sheet of banks and the y-axis NPL rates. The
orange and dark blue lines represent the rate of NPLs that exhaust the excess of own funds over the binding
leverage ratio requirement for the euro area, assuming the same reductions of total assets and total loans. The
dotted lines show NPL rates from selected previous financial crises and from the latest EBA stress test,
Gourinchas et al. (2020), and our estimations in Figure 20. Gourinchas et al. (2020) does not take into account
government support measures.
Sources: EBA 2018; Gourinchas et al. 2020; Laeven and Valencia 2020; author’s analysis.

In general terms, the estimates of NPLs arising from the COVID-19 pandemic seem to be
significantly lower than those observed in previous crises (such as the GFC or the Asian
crisis), despite the large impact of the pandemic on the real economy. The extent of
government support, the existing banking system’s net worth, and the limited duration of
the pandemic may be factors explaining this difference with previous episodes of stress.
Returning to the fourth question posed in the introduction (how many NPLs can banks
absorb given their current non-risk-weighted capital levels), our findings point toward a
resilient banking system in the euro area in aggregated terms. Nonetheless, individual
institutions (or groups of institutions) may be affected as a result of their initial solvency
position and the concentration of their exposures.
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Conclusions

We have estimated the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on nonfinancial corporations and
households and whether that impact could lead to a material new wave of NPLs that could
threaten the solvency of the banking system. We have used the sectoral balance sheets and
flows statements of a stylized economy (without the external sector) in our simulations to
develop estimates of the impact of the pandemic, the potential increase in NPLs, and the
capacity of the banking system to absorb the related losses. The concept of net worth has
also been at the core of our analysis.
Our methodology has several important caveats that must be mentioned here. Our stylized
economy does not consider the external sector, and we do not assess second-round effects
extensively. Second-round effects could worsen the impact of the pandemic on the real
economy through cross-sectoral interconnections and dependencies. Although we have
made extensive use of the available short-term data for nonfinancial corporations and
households, our calculations, made at an aggregated level, are based on many assumptions
and should be regarded as approximations in terms of size, rather than as accurate point
estimates. The assumption that the ratios of nonfinancial corporations follow a normal
distribution must be mentioned here too.
Our main findings, when applied to the euro area, can be summarized as follows.
First, the COVID-19 pandemic is unevenly affecting nonfinancial corporations, depending on
the goods and services they provide. Those providing essential goods or services that can be
consumed remotely are less severely affected than nonfinancial corporations providing
goods and services than cannot be consumed remotely and that are not essential. The impact
on households depends on the percentage of the population working in the most affected
sectors. Given the different economic structures across the euro area, the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic is heterogeneous across countries.
Second, there is a strong correlation between the decrease in sales of nonfinancial
corporations and the duration of the pandemic, measured through the measures taken to
limit economic activity. The longer the duration of the pandemic, the deeper its impact on
the economy, particularly on the most affected sectors. Our scenarios foresee a drop in
corporate turnover of about 30% of the accumulated net worth of the sector by the end of
2021, before taking government support into account.
Third, in scenarios where the pandemic continues, albeit with less intensity, the only way to
prevent a large increase in NPLs is through very large transfers from the governments to
nonfinancial corporations, which can be coupled with large sales of assets by corporations
themselves. An estimated scenario for government support envisages an increase in NPLs
above EUR 700 billion. Designing transfers from the government that are targeted to the
most affected nonfinancial corporations can have a large beneficial effect. Targeted
government support can also mitigate the extent of NPLs from household loans as a result of
corporate insolvencies.
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Fourth, defining the loss-absorbing capacity of the banking system in terms of the excess of
own funds over the binding leverage ratio requirement, euro area banks seem to be resilient
enough, in aggregate, to absorb the losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on the real
economy, without the need to decrease their lending activities. Our findings are aligned to
those by Gourinchas et al. (2020), Aiyar et al. (2021), and OECD (2021). The initial level of
own funds is key to defining the loss-absorbing capacity of banks. Those banks and national
banking systems that entered the COVID-19 crisis in a weaker position may find themselves
close to breaching the binding leverage ratio requirement in case the related credit losses
materialize. Deleverage appears to be the most likely reaction in times of stress, albeit it is
not much effective in increasing the resilience of banks.
With the benefit of hindsight, we have not observed an increase in NPLs in the range of EUR
700 billion, as discussed. Reviewing our calculations, we can attribute this to two main
causes: (i) the extent of government support to nonfinancial corporations, probably going
beyond our assumptions, and (ii) the capacity of the economy to adapt to the new conditions,
mainly referring to the possibilities of teleworking.25 These are also important lessons in
increasing the understanding of the impact of pandemics on the economy.
Finally, there is still some uncertainty about the evolution of the pandemic and how the
economy will emerge from the pandemic, which business models are going to be impaired
permanently, and which ones will succeed. Our paper contributes to the effort to understand
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and on the financial system, but it says
little about how the economy will look like in a few years’ time.

The termination of government support measures in the most recent months may also trigger an increase
in NPLs (ESRB 2021a).
25
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VIII. Appendixes

Appendix A: Balance Sheet of Our Stylized Economy, with
Amounts for the Euro Area at the End of 2019
Figure 27: Stylized Balance Sheet of the Euro Area Economy, at the End of 2019
Households
Assets
Real Estate
Financial assets
Pension rights
Insurance assets
Other assets

Liabilities
32,921
22,454
3,468
na
1,767

Loans
Future tax liabilities
Other liabilities
Net worth

Inflows
Wages
Interest
Dividends
Transfers
Other inflows/outflows

6,896
na
900
52,814

5,751
392
1,188
2,227
3,141

Outflows
Interest of loans
Consumption
Taxes
Savings (change in net worth)

237
6,393
3,361
2,708

Outflows
Wages
Interest of loans
Interest of bonds
Amortisation
Dividends
Other inflows / outflows
Profit (change in net worth)

3,822
203
82
1,227
1,082
385
301

Outflows
Wages
Interest bonds
Dividends
Loan losses
Insurance claims
Other inflows / outflows
Profit (change in net worth)

247
462
358
50
na
0
95

Outflows
Interest of bonds
Consumption
Investment
Transfers
Wages
Other expenses

191
631
333
2,965
1,179
310

Nonfinancial corporations
Assets
Inventories
Customer receivables
Financial assets
Fixed assets

Liabilities
na
3,426
25,501
14,776

Loans
Bonds
Payables to suppliers
Pension rights
Future tax liabilities
Other liabilities
Net worth
Shares and other equity

Inflows
11,284
1,524
3,265
404
na
1,415
3,209
22,602

Capital inflows
Sales
Transfers

1,572
4,792
738

Financial intermediaries
Assets
Loans
Shares
Bonds
Real Estate

Liabilities
20,549
25,245
18,585
18,720

Deposits
Technical reserves
Pension rights
Bonds
Other liabilities
Net worth
Shares and other equity

Inflows
Interest from loans
Dividends
Insurance premia
Capital gains
Asset management fees

28,188
9,300
na
8,119
8,513
911
28,068

695
88
422
7
na

Government
Assets
Future taxes and fees
Fixed assets
Shares
Other financial assets

Liabilities
na
7,525
2,310
1,703

Pension rights
Bonds
Other financial liabilities

Inflows
na
9,371
2,167

Taxes
Fees
Capital revenue
Deficit (surplus)

5,477
na
60
71

Notes: Values in billion euro for the main categories of the balance sheet and flow statement of households,
nonfinancial corporations, financial intermediaries, and the government, taken from the sectoral annual
accounts; “na” refers to those captions not available in current disclosures.
Sources: ECB 2021c; author’s calculations.
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Appendix B: The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Governments and on the External Sector
Confronted with the COVID-19 crisis, the government sector is expected to simultaneously
see a decrease in taxes and fees derived from the reduction in economic activity and an
increase in (1) transfers to households (mainly, unemployment benefits) and to nonfinancial
corporations, and (2) consumption (health care expenses). As a result, deficits are expected
to substantially increase. In theory, if such deficits are temporary, recovery is solid, and there
is a clear path of reduction of the stock of sovereign debt, there should not be large concerns
about the long-term sustainability of sovereign debt.
Considering the external sector, the COVID-19 pandemic affects over the long term the two
main components of the balance of payments (current and capital accounts) and the financial
account. Given the tight commercial relations among different countries in the world, where
supply chains have become global for many goods, exports and imports can change
depending on the nature of the underlying goods and on how they are impacted by the
pandemic. Regarding the provision of cross-border services, the lockdown restrictions have
affected those that cannot be provided remotely (such as tourism), also impairing the
current account of those countries where these services have an important weight in the
economy. Concerning the capital account, an expected retrenchment of cross-border capital
flows can also negatively affect investment. Besides, cross-border banking and financial
flows, also included in the financial account, can vary largely as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic, either as a result of a stronger focus on domestic activities (“home bias”) or as a
“flight to safety” toward countries less affected by the decrease in economic activity, among
other considerations.
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Appendix C: Further Details on the Impact of the Pandemic
across Sectors of Nonfinancial Corporations
Figure 28 shows the degree to which each sector is estimated to provide essential goods and
services and the extent to which they can be consumed remotely, according to Section III.B.
Figure 28: Essential and Remote Characteristics of Goods and Services Provided by
Sector
(A)
Essential

(B)
Remote

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

0.87

0.3

3.82

Mining and quarrying

0.33

0.1

30.00

Manufacturing

0.41

0.4

6.12

Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply

1.00

1.0

1.00

Water supply, sewerage, and waste management and
remediation activities

1.00

1.0

1.00

Construction

0.45

0.1

22.00

Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles

0.26

0.7

5.42

Transporting and storage

1.00

0.3

3.33

Accommodation and food service activities

0.13

0.2

40.00

Information and communication services

1.00

0.9

1.11

Real estate activities

0.01

0.6

166.67

Professional, scientific, and technical activities

1.00

1.0

1.00

Administrative and support service activities

0.01

1.0

100.00

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

0.01

0.2

500.00

Other services activities

0.01

0.5

200.00

Pro memoria: Financial and insurance services

1.00

1.0

1.00

Sector

(A) x(B)
Impact

Notes: The table shows the degree to which the goods and services provided by each sector are essential and
can be consumed remotely, as explained in section III.B. The value of 0.01 is attributed instead of zero, in order
not to arrive at an undetermined expression.
Source: Author’s analysis.

The breakdown of gross value added of nonfinancial corporations, which we use to obtain
the aggregate for nonfinancial corporations, by sector does not fully match the NACE
industry classification codes. As shown in Figure 29, we had to make some adjustments,
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taking averages when necessary. First, the difference between industry (except
construction) and manufacturing, as reported by Eurostat, is mapped to (1) mining and
quarrying, (2) electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; and (3) water supply,
sewerage, and waste management and remediation activities. Second, the Eurostat
wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities sector is
divided equally between (1) wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles, (2) transporting and storage, and (3) accommodation and food service
activities. Similarly, the NACE sectors professional, scientific, and technical activities; and
administrative and support service activities are merged by Eurostat into one sector. The
same occurs with arts, entertainment, and recreation; and other services activities, as they
appear as one in the database of Eurostat.
Figure 29: Equivalence between NACE Codes and Sector Reported in Gross Value
Added by Eurostat
Sector NACE code

Sector Eurostat

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply

Industry (except construction), with
manufacturing separately reported

Water supply, sewerage, and waste management and
remediation activities
Construction

Construction

Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles

Wholesale and retail trade, transport,
accommodation, and food service
activities

Transporting and storage
Accommodation and food service activities
Information and communication services

Information and communication services

Financial and insurance services

Financial and insurance services

Real estate activities

Real estate activities

Professional, scientific, and technical activities

Professional, scientific, and technical
activities; administrative and support
service activities

Administrative and support service activities
Arts, entertainment, and recreation

Arts, entertainment, and recreation; other
service activities; activities of household
and extraterritorial organizations and
bodies

Other services activities
Source: Eurostat; author’s analysis.

Short-term business statistics by Eurostat do not cover all the sectors we consider in our
analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on nonfinancial corporations.
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Figure 30 shows the necessary adjustments to reach full coverage of all NACE sectors.
Figure 30: Adjustments Made to the Sectoral Impact of the Pandemic in Line with
Short-Term Statistics and Data on Gross Value Added
Sector (largest NACE code)

Adjustment to short-term statistics

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

Based on the impact of the pandemic, we use
“transporting and storage”

Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning
supply
Water supply, sewerage, and waste
management and remediation activities
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles
Transporting and storage
Accommodation and food service activities
Information and communication services
Financial and insurance services

No data; we use “professional, scientific, and
technical activities,” based on impact of the
pandemic

Real estate activities

No data; we use data from “construction”

Professional, scientific, and technical activities
Administrative and support service activities
Arts, entertainment, and recreation

No data; we use data from “administrative and
support service activities,” based on impact of
the pandemic

Other services activities

No data; we use data from “administrative and
support service activities,” based on impact of
the pandemic

Notes: Impact of the pandemic refers to the calculations made in Section III.B. See also Table 6.
Source: Eurostat; author’s analysis.

The left panel of Figure 31 compares the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic computed
according to Section III.A and the impact derived from the short-term statistics by Eurostat.
We can observe a strong negative relation between the two approaches (higher impact
translates into lower turnover). Sector I (accommodation and food service activities) can be

162

From Lost Turnover to Nonperforming Loans

Sánchez Serrano

seen as an outlier, since the decrease in net turnover has been much larger than the impact
of the pandemic, based on the nature of the goods and services provided as essential and
remote. Excluding this sector from the computation increases the R2 coefficient to 0.6 (right
panel of Figure 31).
Figure 31: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic Computed as in Section III.A and as
Derived from Short-Term Statistics on Turnover of Nonfinancial Corporations
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

0

0

-0.05

-0.02

3

4

5

6

7

-0.06

-0.15

-0.08

-0.2

-0.3

2

-0.04

-0.1

-0.25

1

-0.1
R² = 0.341

-0.12
-0.14

-0.35

-0.16

-0.4

-0.18

-0.45

-0.2

R² = 0.5999

Notes: The x-axis shows the impact, in natural logarithms (ln), of the COVID-19 pandemic on nonfinancial
corporations, according to Equation (1). The y-axis shows the decrease in turnover per sector derived from the
short-term business statistics by Eurostat between March 2020 and December 2020, as derived in Section IV.B.
The right panel excludes the sector accommodation and food service activities, which appears as an outlier in
the left panel (very low value for the y-axis).
Source: Author’s analysis.
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